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THE RISE OF THE PERPETUAL TRUST 
* Jesse Dukeminier 
Jam es E. Krier·· 
For more than two centuries, the Rule against Perpetuities has served as the 
chief means of limiting a transferor's power to tie up property by way of successive 
contingent interests. But recently, at least seventeen jurisdictions in the United 
States have enacted statutes abolishing the Rule in the case of perpetual (or near-
perpetual) trusts. The prime mover behind this important development has been 
the federal Generation-Skipping Transfer Tax. This Article traces the gradual 
decline of the common law Rule against Perpetuities, considers the dynamics 
behind the recent wave of state legislation, examines the problems that might result 
from the rise of perpetual trusts, and suggests some possible solutions. 
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In 1951 Professor W. Barton Leach paid homage to the Rule against 
Perpetuities, calling it "the sanctum sanctorum of the law."1 Like much of 
American property law, the Rule began in England. It developed slowly there, 
reaching maturity only after a century and a half (1680-1833). Its history 
implies a certain hardiness, which in fact the Rule enjoyed-until recently. 
Leach said it provided lawyers in the United States with "a blessed sheltering 
realization that lives-in-being-and-twenty-one years have the same validity 
after two world wars and four Democratic administrations that they had when 
Queen Victoria ascended the throne."2 Yet, only a year later, Leach attacked 
the Rule as a "technicality-ridden legal nightmare" in urgent need of reform.3 
Ever since Leach's assault, the Rule has been in decline, especially in the 
United States, where matters are now moving apace. In a growing number of 
jurisdictions, property owners are suddenly free to control the destiny of their 
estates with a cold dead hand, by way of perpetual trusts. 
How did this reversal of an old but vital policy come about, and with 
what consequences? 
I. THE NEW PERPETUAL TRUST 
A. The Fall of the Rule Against Perpetuities 
We begin with some background, familiar to many but perhaps not to 
all. Under the common law Rule against Perpetuities, a contingent future 
interest must vest, if at all, within twenty-one years after the expiration of 
some life in being when the interest was created. Any possibility, however 
remote, that an interest might vest beyond lives-in-being plus twenty-one 
years invalidated the interest. The orthodox Rule has been remorseless in its 
application, and the possibilities that void an interest are often ridiculous. 
Here are three classic examples: 
Case I. T devises a fund in trust to pay the income to A (age 
seventy) for life, then to pay the income to A's children for their 
lives, then to pay the principal to A's grandchildren then living. The 
law conclusively presumes that it is possible for A to have another 
child. Thus the remainder to A's grandchildren is void because it may 
1. W. BARTON LEACH, CASES AND TEXT ON THE LAW OF WILLS 203 (2d ed. 1951). 
2. Id. 
3. W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror, 65 HARV. 
L. REV. 721, 723 (1952). 
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not vest until the death of an afterbom child of A-more than twenty-
one years after the deaths of A and A's presently living children. This 
is the famous case of "The Fertile Octogenarian," of which Professor 
Leach made great sport.4 
Case 2. T devises a fund in trust to pay the income to A for life, 
then to pay the income to A's widow for life, then to pay the principal 
to A's issue then living. The remainder to A's issue is void because it 
might not vest until the widow's death, and the widow cannot be used 
as a measuring life. If A is presently married, A's wife may be divorced 
or die, and A may marry a much younger woman not born by the time 
of T's devise, who subsequently becomes A's widow. This is the case 
imaginatively titled "The Unborn Widow" by Leach. 5 
Case 3. T devises a fund in trust to pay the income to A for life, 
then to pay the principal to A's children who reach twenty-five. The 
remainder is a gift to a class, and if a share in a class gift may vest too 
remotely for one member of the class, the whole class gift is void. 
The remainder to A's children who reach twenty-five is void because 
A might die leaving a child under the age of four. That child's share 
might vest more than twenty-one years after A's death, a possibility 
that invalidates the whole class gift. 
1. Wait-and-See 
1305 
Leach considered these cases absurd; in each, the Rule destroys a reason-
able gift which almost surely would vest in time. Why not, he proposed, wait 
and see what happened? If, in Case 1, A did not have another child, the remain-
der to A's grandchildren would vest at the death of A and A's children, all 
lives-in-being at T's death. If, in Case 2, A's widow turned out to be a woman 
alive at T's death, the remainder to A's issue would vest at the death of A 
and his widow, both lives-in-being at T's death. And, in Case 3, if all of A's chil-
dren were over the age of four at A's death, the remainder would vest within 
twenty-one years after A's death and would be valid. 
Several events led to Leach's embrace of the wait-and-see doctrine. In 
1947, Pennsylvania adopted a statute providing that the validity of an interest 
under the Rule against Perpetuities must be determined by what actually 
happens, as opposed to what might.6 It was the first wait-and-see statute, and 
a challenge to conventional thinking-including the thinking of Leach, who 
later explained why, in 1952, he began to change his mind about the common 
4. See W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51 HARV. L. REV. 638, 643-44 (1938). 
5. Id. at 644. 
6. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 301.4(b) (West 1950) (current version at 20 PA. CONS. 
STAT. ANN.§ 6104(b) (West Supp. 2002)). 
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law Rule. First, he had agreed to write about perpetuities for the forthcoming 
American Law of Property, and he wanted to produce more than a mere 
condensed version of John Chipman Gray's great book.7 Second, Leach had 
spent a sabbatical term in England, lecturing on perpetuities at Oxford, and 
took up wait-and-see as a provocation "which would keep the students 
awake and in attendance."8 
Leach's advocacy of wait-and-see shook up the conservative academic 
property and trusts community. Lewis Simes, a professor at the University of 
Michigan Law School and one of the leading commentators on future interests, 
rose up immediately to speak against wait-and-see.9 First, he found it unclear 
whose lives we are to wait out. Second, he believed that wait-and-see jeopard-
ized the certainty of tide provided by the traditional Rule; considerable incon-
venience could arise from not knowing for an extended pedod of time whether 
an interest is valid or void. Third, he worried that wait-and-see took a long 
step in favor of dead-hand control. "If the 'wait and see' doctrine is generally 
adopted," Simes said, "in my opinion the common law rule against perpetui-
ties, in anything like the form in which we know it, will cease to exist."10 The 
first two concerns turned out to be oflitde moment. 11 The third was prescient. 
Others soon joined the great debate started by Leach and Simes, which 
came to resemble a holy war.12 It ended, for a time, with Leach's death in 
1971. By then, wait-and-see for the full perpetuities period had been adopted 
in Pennsylvania, Kentucky, Mississippi, New Hampshire, Ohio, and Vermont. 13 
7. JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES (Roland Gray ed., 4th ed. 
1942) (1886). 
8. W. BARTON LEACH & JAMES K. LOGAN, CASES AND TEXT ON FUTURE INTERESTS 
AND EsTATE PLANNING 835 (1961). 
9. Lewis M. Simes, Is the Rule Against Perpetuities Doomed? The "Wait and See" Doctrine, 52 
MICH. L. REV. 179, 184-90 (1953). 
10. Id. at 190. 
11. Regarding Simes's first point, it happens that the lives relevant to vesting can in our 
view be ascertained rather easily. See Jesse Dukeminier, Perpetuities: The Measuring Lives, 85 
COLUM. L. REV. 1648, 1654-74 (1985). For debate on this point see Lawrence W. Waggoner, 
Perpetuities: A Perspective on Wait-and-See, id. at 1714; Jesse Dukeminier, A Response by Professor 
Dukeminier, id. at 1730; Lawrence W. Waggoner, A Rejoinder by Professor Waggoner, id. at 1739; 
Jesse Dukeminier, A Final Comment by Professor Dukeminier, id. at 1742. As to the second point, 
in the fifty years that wait-and-see has been with us, no practical difficulties have arisen in the 
application of the doctrine to trusts. 
12. For a comprehensive list of articles on wait-and-see, see 10 RICHARD R. POWELL, 
POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 75A.07 (Michael Allan Wolf ed., 2000). One particularly prickly 
article, in which Leach replied to his critics with stinging wit, is W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities 
Legislation: Hail, Pennsylvania!, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 1124 (1960). 
13. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 381.216 (Michie 2002); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2131.08 
(West Supp. 2003); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 301.4(b) (West 1950) (current version at 20 PA. 
STAT. ANN. § 6104(b) (West Supp. 2002)); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 501 (2002); Phelps v. 
Shropshire, 183 So. 2d 158, 162 (Miss. 1966); Merchs. Nat'l Bank v. Curtis, 97 A.2d 207, 212 
(N.H. 1953). 
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Limited wait-and-see statutes had been adopted in Connecticut, Illinois, 
Maine, Massachusetts, Maryland, and Washington.14 
In the late 1970s, Professor A. James Casner, Leach's colleague at Harvard, 
resumed the assault on the orthodox Rule that Leach had begun. Casner 
was appointed Reporter for the Restatement (Second) of Property, Donative 
Transfers. Instead of beginning the new Restatement with "Types" of donative 
transfers or "Creation" of donative instruments-a traditional starting point 
for Restatements-Casner began with the Rule against Perpetuities. He was set 
on writing wait-and-see into the Second Restatement and wasted no time 
about it. Professor Richard R. Powell, the reporter for the First Restatement of 
Property, came out of retirement at age eighty-eight to speak in opposition. 
For two annual meetings of the American Law Institute, Casner and Powell 
were locked in robust debate. At the second meeting, in 1979, Casner, the 
Reporter, prevailed. The wait-and-see doctrine was adopted by the Second 
Restatement. 15 
Instead of using the lives relevant to vesting as the measuring lives, the 
Restatement drafters fashioned a list of specific measuring lives, and wrote 
them into the Restatement.16 Mandating an artificial list of lives for wait-
and-see was a highly unusual practice for a Restatement, which is ordinarily 
concerned with articulating principles to be adopted by courts. In any event, 
it turned out that the Restatement list was unprincipled, full of holes, and 
unworkable. 17 The idea went no further than Iowa, which by statute adopted 
wait-and-see with an expanded version of the Restatement list of measuring 
lives. 18 
2. The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities 
The next development in the decline of the orthodox Rule against 
Perpetuities, and arguably far more significant than anything that had come 
before, started with the work of the National Conference of Commissioners 
on Uniform State Laws, which in the mid-1980s appointed a group to draft 
14. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 2912d-2916d (1955) (wait-and-see during life estate) (current 
version at CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-490--496 (West 1993 & Supp. 2002)); ILL. ANN. STAT. 
ch. 30, § 195 (West Supp. 1992) (wait-and-see for the lives of trust beneficiaries plus twenty-one 
years) (current version at 765 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. 305/5 (West 1993)); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 33 § 101 (West 1999) (wait-and-see during life estate); MD. ANN. CODE. of 1957 art. 16, § 197 A 
(Michie 1966) (wait-and-see during life estate); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 184A, § l (Law. Co-op. 
Supp. 2002) (wait-and-see during life estate); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.§§ 11.98.010-.030 (West 
2003) (wait-and-see for lives of trust beneficiaries plus twenty-one years). 
15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DoNATIVE TRANSFERS§ 1.4 (1983). 
16. Id. at§ l.3(2). 
17. See Dukeminier, Perpetuities: The Measuring Lives, supra note 11, at 1674-1701. 
18. IOWA CODE ANN.§ 558.68 (West 1992). 
1308 50 UCLA LAW REVIEW 1303 (2003) 
a Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities (USRAP). The drafters, headed 
by Professor Lawrence Waggoner of the University of Michigan, decided to 
adopt the wait-and-see approach, but to sidestep the issue of measuring lives 
by substituting a fixed ninety-year period. One reason for doing so (hardly 
the only one) was the fact that it is easier to tick ninety years off a calendar 
than to keep track of a bunch of life histories; and ninety years was figured 
to approximate "the average period of time that would traditionally be allowed 
by the wait-and-see doctrine."19 
Under USRAP,20 interests are valid if they comply with either the 
common law Rule against Perpetuities or the ninety-year period of wait-
and-see. Thus if, at the time of its creation, a contingent interest will 
necessarily vest, if at all, within lives-in-being plus twenty-one years, it is 
valid. Similarly, if, at the time of its creation, a contingent interest will 
necessarily vest, if at all, within ninety years, it is also valid. If, however, a 
contingent interest is not certain to vest or fail within one of those two 
periods, we wait to see if it actually vests within ninety years. If it does not, 
the interest will be reformed by a court at the end of the ninety years so as 
19. See Lawrence W. Waggoner, The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities: The Ration-
ale of the 90-Year Waiting Period, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 157, 162 (1988) [hereinafter Waggoner, The 
Rationale]. For further discussion of the reasons behind the Uniform Statutory Rule Against 
Perpetuities' (USRAP's) move to a fixed period, see Lawrence W. Waggoner, Perpetuities: A Progress 
Report on the Draft Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities, in THE TWENTIETH ANNUAL PHILIP 
E. HECKERLING INSTITUTE ON EsTATE PLANNING 700 (John T. Gaubatz ed., 1986). 
20. The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities (USRAP) has been adopted in twenty-four 
states: ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 14-2901 (West Supp. 2002) (amended to permit perpetual trusts); CAL. 
PROB. CODE §§ 21200-21225 (West Supp. 2003); COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 15-11-1101-1107 (2002); 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§§ 45a-490-496 (West 1993 & Supp. 2002); FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 689.225 
(West Supp. 2003) (360 years substituted for ninety in 2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 44-6-200 
(Michie Supp. 2002); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN.§§ 525-1-6 (Michie 2000); IND. CODE ANN.§§ 32-
1-4.5-1-6 (Michie 1995 & Supp. 2001); KAN. STAT. ANN.§§ 59-3401-3408 (1994); MASS. ANN. 
LAWS ch. 184A, §§ 1-11 (Law. Co-op. 1996); MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN.§§ 554.71-78 (West 
Supp. 2002); MINN. STAT. ANN.§§ 501A.01-07 (West 2001 & Supp.); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 72-
2-1001-1017 (2001); NEB. REV. STAT.§§ 76-2001-2008 (1996 & Supp. 2002) (amended to permit 
perpetual trusts); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.§§ 111.103-.1039 (Michie Supp. 2001) (amended to permit 
perpetual trusts); N.M. STAT. ANN.§§ 45-2-901-906 (Michie 1998 & Supp. 2001); N.C. GEN. 
STAT.§§ 41-15-22 (Lexis 2001); N.0. CENT. CODE§ 47-02-27 (Lexis 1999); OR. REV. STAT. 
§§ 105.950-.975 (1999); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 27-6-10-80 (Law. Co-op. 1991); TENN. CODE 
ANN. §§ 66-1-201-208 (Lexis Supp. 2001); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-2-1201-1208 (Lexis Supp. 
2002); VA. CODE ANN.§ 55-12.l (Michie Supp. 2002) (amended to permit perpetual trusts); W. 
VA. CODE ANN.§§ 36-lA-1-8 (Michie 1997). 
Alaska and New Jersey adopted USRAP but later repealed it, together with the Rule against 
Perpetuities. ALASKA STAT.§ 34.27.050 (Lexis 2002) (repealed 2000); N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:2F-l 
(West Supp. 2002) (repealed 1999). Both states adopted South Dakota and Wisconsin's rule against 
suspension of the power of alienation. See infra note 38. 
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to most closely approximate the dispositive plan of the donor and vest within 
h . d 21 t at per10 . 
When considering the merits of a ninety-year perpetuities period, we 
need to think about why lives-in-being plus twenty-one years was fixed as 
the perpetuities period in the first place. At the time of the formulation of the 
Rule against Perpetuities, land ownership gave families power, status, and 
wealth. Heads of families-the fathers-were much concerned about securing 
family land from incompetent sons. Recognizing this concern as legitimate, 
English judges developed, case-by-case, an appropriate period during which 
the father's judgment could prevail in family settlements. The father could 
realistically and perhaps wisely assess the capabilities of living members of his 
family, and so, with respect to them, the judges permitted the father's informed 
judgment, solemnly inscribed in an instrument, to be given effect. But the 
head of family could know nothing of unborn persons. Hence, the father was 
permitted to control only so long as his judgment was informed with an 
understanding of the capabilities and needs of persons alive when the judgment 
was made. Subsequently, the judges permitted an extension of control beyond 
lives-in-being if any of the persons in the next generation were minors. 
Finally, after about 150 years, the judges fixed the period as lives-in-being plus 
twenty-one years thereafter. Leach observed that the balance struck by the 
courts permitted "a man of property ... [to] provide for all of those in his family 
whom he personally knew and the first generation after them upon attaining 
majority."22 . 
USRAP abandons this centuries-old common law policy, instead per-
mitting dead-hand control for ninety years, whether or not the beneficiaries 
are known to the donor. The ninety year period is not, of course, mandatory; 
donors may reach out to that limit, but they are hardly required to do so. To 
put the point another way-the way of the USRAP Reporter-" contingencies 
in the vast majority of perpetuity-violation cases will be resolved long before 
the waiting period expires .... Having an unused end-portion of the waiting 
period does no harm and its length has nothing at all to do with dead-hand 
control."23 That is true, of course, provided that the end-portion is unused, but 
will it be? Some commentators see conventional wait-and-see as "principally 
a salvage doctrine," whereas, in their view, "USRAP is more likely to become 
a planning doctrine; trust settlors might intentionally use the statute's provisions 
21. For a suggestion of the anomalies that can arise from USRAP's "valid-this-way-or-that" 
approach, see JOEL c. DoBRIS ET AL., Es'TATES AND Tuusrs: CASES AND MATERIALS 897-98 (2d 
ed. 2003). 
22. 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY§ 24.16, at 51 (A. James Casner ed., 1952). 
23. Waggoner, The Rationale, supra note 19, at 165 n.26. 
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to extend the period of dead-hand control."24 If settlors do have such plans in 
mind, then we might expect to see moves in the direction of even longer 
periods, say 125 years, or 150, or 360, or 1000, or forever. And we do. 25 
Lives-in-being, and the policy underlying them, have served as the moor-
ings of the orthodox Rule against Perpetuities (and, for all of that, of 
traditional wait-and-see). By cutting free from that formulation, USRAP set 
perpetuities adrift, in at least two respects. First, notwithstanding that ninety 
years might equal the period one could accomplish under the Rule, ninety is 
on its face a number and not a principle. The drafters of USRAP, no doubt 
unintentionally, made an arguably damaging reductionist move. To reduce 
matters to "ninety years" is to obscure the purposes of restrictions on dead-
hand control, especially in the minds of those people (which is to say just 
about everybody) who do not quite understand control of perpetuities in the 
first place. USRAP makes a mere number the salient thing, the topic of debates, 
the target of reforms, the subject of marginal alterations--extensions by a few 
years, by a few decades, by a couple of centuries or so. 
Second, USRAP encourages lawyers to abandon the old ship. It puts 
the Rule in suspension for ninety years, during which period no interest may 
be struck as void. 26 It is doubtful that, after nearly a century of irrelevance, 
24. JOEL C. 00BRIS ET AL., supra note 21, at 895. 
25. 125 years. English Law Commission Report No. 251, The Rules Against Perpetuities and 
Excessive Accumulations (1998), recommends abolishing the common law Rule against Perpetuities 
and replacing it with a wait-and-see period of 125 years. The commission chose 125 years because it 
is probably the longest period that can be obtained under present law using royal lives as the measur-
ing lives (comparable to using twelve healthy babies in this country). 
150 years. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.98.130 (West Supp. 2003) was amended in 2001 to 
permit a 150-year wait-and-see period for trusts. 
360 years. FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 689.225(2)(£) (West Supp. 2003) substitutes 360 years for the 
ninety-year wait-and-see period of USRAP. Why 360 years? Professor Adam Hirsch of Florida 
State University College of Law writes: 
There was a story going around that our legislators simply took USRAP's 90-year limit and 
multiplied it by four, but that could well be apocryphal. This much 1 do know: The banking 
lobby wanted to repeal the Rule entirely in order to retain local trust business, but leg-
islators preferred to retain some time limit. At one point there was talk of establishing a 
thousand-year time limit, fucilitating what were to be called "Millennial Trusts." How 360 years 
ultimately came to be the magic number 1 cannot say, but 1 am quite certain that the number 
was arrived at arbitrarily. 
Letter from Adam Hirsch to Jesse Dukeminier (Feb. 22, 2002). 
1000 years. Wyoming recently adopted legislation amending its Rule against Perpetuities to 
provide that as to trusts created after July 1, 2003, a settlor may exempt a trust from the Rule (other 
than as to real property assets) if the trust instrument explicitly states that the Rule is not to apply 
and further states that the trust is to terminate no later than one thousand years after the trust's 
creation. Wyo. H.B. 77 (2003). 
Forever. Statutes in seventeen states now permit perpetual trusts. See infra notes 37, 40-45. 
26. USRAP is popular with the bar perhaps in part because it frees lawyers of potential 
malpractice liability for violating the Rule. Since under USRAP the Rule cannot strike down an 
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many lawyers will be capable of coming back to the old Rule, especially given 
its maddening complexities and sphinxian riddles. 27 Indeed, lawyers of the 
future are unlikely even to be introduced to the Rule in their legal educations. 
There is too much pressure on the curricular needs of law schools to dwell for 
long on dormant doctrine. 28 
Edward Rabin and Roberta and Jeffrey Kwall, the authors of a casebook 
used in first-year Property courses, ask this: "Do we really have, in USRAP, 
a de facto repeal of the rule, as to interests created after USRAP is adopted? If 
so, why not simply repeal the rule outright and avoid the pretense that 
USRAP simply modifies the rule?"29 To date, more than a third of the states 
have done just that.30 
B. The Rise of the Perpetual Trust 
The two reforms traced above-the wait-and-see doctrine, and then, 
especially, USRAP-might have weakened the Rule against Perpetuities, but 
they honored its purpose. Neither reform embodied any intention to free 
the dead hand of age-old restrictions; to the contrary, both shared that central 
policy of the Rule. But they, as much as the old Rule, are being undermined 
interest for ninety years after an instrument takes effect, lawyers are absolved of malpractice for 
their entire professional careers. 
27. For furrher elucidation of this position, see Jesse Dukeminier, The Uniform Statutory 
Rule Against Perpetuities: Ninety Years in Umbo, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1023, 1026-28 (1987). 
28. The unreformed common law Rule against Perpetuities exists today in only a small 
handful of states. The only populous state where the Rule has bite is New York, if the instrument 
does not qualify for the limited reforms made in New York law. See N.Y. EsT. POWERS & TRUSTS 
LAW§§ 9-1.2 & 9-1.3 (McKinney 2002). 
Unsurprisingly, law school curricula appear to reflect the decline of the orthodox Rule, or so a 
casual survey suggests. In the 1950s, many weeks, sometimes half a semester, were spent on the 
subject at leading schools like Harvard and Yale. Today, a student at the Harvard Law School is likely 
to confront the Rule for only three or four hours in the basic Property course. Wills and Trusts is 
offered only intermittently at Harvard, and one visitor who taught it recalls spending only two hours 
on the Rule. At Yale Law School the Rule gets a single hour in Property, itself an elective course, and 
no coverage in Wills and Trusts. Courses at Columbia and Stanford give about three hours to the 
subject in the Property course; teachers at Berkeley do about the same, and devote even less attention 
to the Rule in Wills and Trusts. At these schools, and, we suppose, many others, only minimal attention 
is paid to the Rule's complex and difficult mechanics, in the belief that these will be worked out 
during the wait-and-see period. The focus is on abstract policy. This is probably a wise choice as a 
practical matter, because in states that have adopted wait-and-see, litigation involving the Rule 
against Perpetuities has virtually disappeared. 
The situation in England, which adopted wait-and-see for lives on a statutory list in 1964, 
appears to be similar to that in the United States as far as teaching is concerned. See, e.g., P.H. 
Kenny, Conveyancer's Notebook, 1998 CONY. & PROP. LAW. (n.s.) 241, 243. 
29. EDWARD H. RABIN ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN PROPERTY LAW 201 (4th ed. 
2000). 
30. See infra notes 37-48. 
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by the recent wave of state legislation permitting perpetual trusts. To account 
for that legislation, we have to begin with the federal estate tax. 
1. The Generation-Skipping Transfer Tax 
The federal estate tax, first enacted in 1916, levies a tax on any property 
interest transferred by will, intestacy, or survivorship to another person, except 
for transfers to spouses and charities.31 The tax can be avoided, however, by the 
use of life estates. At the death of a life tenant, the tenancy ends, leaving no 
transfer to be taxed. For seventy years, lawyers took advantage of this loophole 
by creating trusts with successive life estates, which could continue without 
any estate taxes being levied against succeeding generations until after the 
termination of the trust. And the trusts themselves could continue until the 
Rule against Perpetuities, in one or another variant, called a halt. Here is an 
example: 
Case 4. T devises property in trust to pay the income to his 
daughter A for life, then to pay the income to A's children for their 
lives, then to distribute the principal to A's grandchildren (with a saving 
clause or other wording to avoid a perpetuities violation). At T's death 
an estate tax is levied on the property, but no estate tax is levied at the 
death of A or at the death of A's children because these persons do not 
have interests transferable on death. An estate tax will not be levied again 
until the death of A's grandchildren, perhaps more than a hundred years 
after T's death. 
In 1986 Congress closed this loophole in the tax laws, deciding that a 
transfer tax is due at the expiration of each generation. After 1986, if a trans-
feror creates a life estate in a child that avoids ("skips") the federal estate tax 
at the child's death, as in Case 4, a generation-skipping transfer (OST) tax is 
due at the child's death if the property passes to the next generation.32 The OST 
tax is levied at the highest rate of the estate tax (50 percent in 2001). In 
Case 4, no federal estate tax is payable at A's death because A does not have a 
transmissible interest. However, at A's death, a generation-skipping transfer 
occurs, from T to his grandchildren. And so, at A's death, the OST tax is levied 
on the value of the nonexempt corpus of the trust. Upon the death of A's chil-
dren, another generation-skipping transfer tax is levied.33 
31. There is a complementary federal gift tax on inter vivas gifts. 
32. l.R.C. § 2612 (1994). 
33. Trusts created before 1986 were grandfathered. They are exempt from the OST tax. 
l.R.C. § 2601(1) (1986). Before 1986, perpetual trusts were permitted only in Wisconsin, South 
Dakota, and Idaho. See infra note 3 7. In other states, trusts were governed by the Rule against Perpetui-
ties. Although the evidence is scanty, it appears that perpetual trusts were not created in these three 
states prior to 1986. See Leach, supra note 12. 
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At the same time it amended the federal transfer tax laws by adding 
the GST tax, Congress lightened the taxpayer burden by providing a $1 
million exemption from the GST tax for each transferor (doubled in the 
case of married couples). An inflation adjustment in 2002 increased the 
amount to $1.1 million; it will increase again to $1.5 million in 2004 and 
ultimately, in gradual steps, to $3.5 million in 2009. The exemption can be 
allotted to direct gifts to grandchildren or to a trust producing one or more 
generation-skipping transfers.34 The estate tax law itself places no limitation on 
the duration of such trusts. A transferor can create a trust, with. $1.1 million 
($3.5 million after 2008) as principal, for his children for life, with succes-
sive life estates in succeeding generations, for as long as state perpetuities law 
allows. Thanks to the exemption, no estate tax or GST tax is due until the trust 
terminates. In states following the Rule against Perpetuities, these tax-exempt 
dynasty trusts35 can endure for lives-in-being at the creation of the trust, plus 
twenty-one years;36 in USRAP states they can last for that period or for ninety 
years. 
2. State Legislation 
When Congress enacted the GST tax, it probably assumed that most 
states would continue to adhere to the Rule against Perpetuities in one or 
another variation, but this has proved unfounded. Before 1986, only three 
states-Idaho, South Dakota, and Wisconsin-had abolished the Rule and 
adopted a prohibition against suspension of the power of alienation.37 Perpet-
ual trusts have thus been permitted in these states for some time, provided 
there is some person, such as a trustee with a power of sale, who can transfer 
34. I.R.C. § 263l(a) (1994); I.R.C. § 263l(c) (2002). 
35. See generally Jesse Dukeminier, Dynasty Trusts: Sheltering Descendants fram Transfer Taxes, 
23 Esr. PLAN. 417 (1996). The term "dynasty trust" is usually taken to mean "a trust set up primarily 
to perpetuate the trust estate for as long a period as possible," commonly by way "of a chain of life 
interests .... " Lawrence M. Friedman, The Dynastic Trust, 73 YALE L.J. 547, 547-48 (1964). 
Friedman contrasts with this the "caretaker trust," which "is usually short-term, spanning one life-time 
or less. It exists to protect and serve the interests or needs of one or more particular beneficiaries." Id. 
at 547. Typically, "the private dynastic trust also has elements of the caretaker trust." Id. at 548. 
36. Actually, the Rule against Perpetuities does not require that trusts terminate within the 
perpetuities period, but only that interests in the trust vest within that period. Requiring interests 
to vest, however, results in termination of a trust after the ending of all life estates vesting within 
the period. Saving clauses often tenninate trusts within the perpetuities period. Bearing these quali-
fications in mind, lawyers commonly say-for ease of discussion-that a trust can endure for the per-
petuities period. 
37. IDAHO CODE § 55-111 (Michie 2000) (statute not entirely clear); S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS§§ 43-5-1, 43-5-8 (Michie 1997); WIS. STAT. ANN.§ 700.16 (West 2001). 
1314 50 UCLA LAW REVIEW 1303 ( 2003) 
title to (alienate) the trust property.38 But since 1986, at least seventeen more 
states have enacted legislation permitting perpetual, or almost perpetual, 
trusts, with some significant variation in statutory terms.39 Alaska and New 
Jersey adopted the law of South Dakota and Wisconsin.40 Arizona, Indiana, 
and Nebraska amended USRAP to provide that it does not apply to trusts 
containing a power of sale in the trustee.41 In Virginia, another USRAP juris-
diction, the Rule against Perpetuities does not apply if the trust instrument 
so states.42 The same holds true in the District of Columbia, Illinois, Maine, 
Maryland, Missouri, and Ohio, so long as the trust gives the trustee the power 
of sale.43 Delaware's statute states that no interest in personal property held 
in trust shall be subject to the Rule.44 Rhode Island has simply abolished the 
Rule outright.45 Wyoming provides that a settlor may exempt a trust from the 
· Rule against Perpetuities if the trust document indicates that the trust will 
terminate within one thousand years after its creation.46 Florida has extended 
its USRAP wait-and-see period from ninety years to 360 years for any interest 
in trust.47 Washington now provides that no interest in trust is invalid for 
150 years.48 
The foregoing list will almost certainly grow. As of this writing, at least 
five states are considering proposals to permit perpetual trusts, and more are 
likely to follow.49 The reason has little if anything to do with some wish on 
38. In South Dakota and Wisconsin the power of alienation is also not suspended if a person 
has the power to terminate the trust. 
39. As we shall see, the terms of a statute permitting perpetual trusts are important, especially 
with respect to special powers of appointment. See infra text accompanying notes 121-128. 
40. ALASKA STAT.§§ 34.27.051, 34.27.100 (Lexis 2002) (stating that a trustee must have 
a power of sale or a person must have a power to terminate the trust); N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 46:2F-10 
(West Supp. 2002) (echoing the rule in Alaska). 
41. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 14-2901 (West Supp. 2002) (noting that a trustee must have 
a power of sale and a person must have a power to terminate the trust); IND. H.B. 1116 (2003 ); NEB. 
REV. STAT.§ 76-2005 (2002). 
42. VA. CODE ANN.§ 55-13.3(c) (Michie Supp. 2002). 
43. D.C. CODE § 19-904(10) (2002); 765 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. 305/4(a)(8) (West 
1993); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 101-A(l) (West Supp. 2002); Mo. CODE ANN., EsT. AND 
TRUSTS§ 11-102(e) (2001); Mo. ANN. STAT.§ 456.236 (West Supp. 2003); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN.§ 2131.09(8) (West Supp. 2003). Presumably the requirement that the trust instrument declare 
that the Rule against Perpetuities is not to apply is meant to give some assurance that the trust will 
be drafted by an experienced estate planner who will create powers of appointment in the beneficiaries 
and powers in the trustee. 
44. DEL CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 503(a) (Michie Supp. 2000) (stating that a trust of real prop-
erty is limited to 110 years). 
45. R.l. GEN. LAWS§ 34-11-38 (1995). 
46. See supra note 25. 
4 7. See supra note 25. 
48. See supra note 25. 
49. The five states are Connecticut, Iowa, Kentucky, New Hampshire, and Texas. The status 
of the proposals varies from state to state. In at least one additional state, New York, there appears to 
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the part of wealthy people to control the lives of their unknown descendants; 
rather, it has to do with their interest in saving on federal transfer taxes 
imposed at the descendants' deaths, and on competition among the states 
to cater to that interest.so As mentioned earlier, perpetual trusts have long 
been permitted in Idaho, South Dakota, and Wisconsin, but they were 
seldom created before the appearance of the GST tax in 1986. Once the 
GST tax was enacted, however, perpetual trusts became much more attrac-
tive, and suddenly the three perpetual-trust states had a comparative 
advantage in attracting trust business and capital. 
This did not go unnoticed. Delaware, the first state to permit perpetual 
trusts after 1986, did so explicitly to remain competitive in the trust market.s1 
One state after another followed suit, and, so far as one can tell, all for that 
same reason. New Jersey, for example, repealed its USRAP "to permit banks 
and trust companies to offer 'dynasty trusts' to their customers, such as those 
that are being offered by banks and trust companies located in other states," like 
Delaware and South Dakota.s2 In Connecticut, where perpetual trust legislation 
is being considered, local banks and lawyers have argued that "people who 
want to set up dynastic trusts for their grandchildren, great-grandchildren 
and down the line of generations, are doing them in other states."53 Of course, 
Connecticut lawyers can, even without state legislation, draft trusts to be set up 
elsewhere, but when they do they usually work in consultation with lawyers 
in the other states; this increases legal fees and "sometimes causes the client 
to simply hire out-of-state counsel in the first place."s4 
It is difficult to get hard data on the popularity of perpetual trusts among 
consumers, but there appears to be enough interest among the relatively 
wealthy to create a tidy market. South Dakota, for example, has enjoyed a sub-
stantial increase in trust business since 1986, most of it on behalf of non-
resident clients ("S.D. is not a wealthy state, so there would be only a small 
proportion of its residents who would have call for such trusts").ss The other 
be considerable interest in perpetual trust legislation. See, e.g., Charles F. Gibbs & Colleen F. Carew, 
Trusts Leaving New York, Situs in Cyberspace: Time for Legislation?, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 20, 2002, at 3. 
50. See Ira M. Bloom, The OST Tax Tail Is Killing the Rule Against Perpetuities, 87 TAX NOTES 
569 (2000). 
51. Jesse Dukeminier, The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities and the GST Tax: New 
Perils for Practitioners and New Opportunities, 30 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 185, 208 n.54 (1995) 
("The preamble to the [Delaware] statute states that its purpose is to keep Delaware competitive in 
the formation of trust capital, which was moving to South Dakota and Wisconsin .... "). 
52. A. 2804, 208th Leg. (N.J. 1999). 
53. Thomas Scheffey, ls Immortality Just Around the Corner? "Dead Hand" Trust Law Relaxes 
Its Grip, CONN. L. TRIB., Mar. 4, 2002, at 10 (quoting "veteran estate tax specialist" Frank S. Berall). 
54. Id. 
55. E-mail correspondence between Tom Foye, a South Dakota attorney, and James E. Krier, 
Professor of Law at the University of Michigan Law School (Feb. 18, 2003 ). 
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two bellwether states, Idaho and Wisconsin, have not fared nearly as well, 
and for a simple reason: Unlike South Dakota, they have a state income 
tax.56 One New York City lawyer guesses, based on his own experience, that 
the number of perpetual trusts created nationwide now runs into the thou-
sands per year; his firm "alone probably does 100 or more annually." His 
brother works for an Alaska trust company that has done "700 or so I would 
guess. South Dakota and Delaware institutions probably have more."57 
Marketing is part of the picture; people involved in the trust business 
have not been shy in their efforts to attract customers. At least one Wisconsin 
bank tried to market perpetual trusts around the country shortly after the 
OST tax appeared; banks in New York, California, and elsewhere set up South 
Dakota branches so their clients could have perpetual trusts there. One South 
Dakota trust company now offers dynasty trusts fashioned to provide maximum 
flexibility to nonresident clients. They are welcome to have their trusts drafted 
elsewhere, overseen by their own out-of-state investment managers, and so 
on, but the trusts have their situs in South Dakota. Books and records are 
kept in South Dakota, trades are executed there, trust administration is provided 
by the local trust company. These are sufficient contacts to qualify the trusts 
for the benefits of South Dakota law.58 
C. Ambiguity 
Superficially, at least, our account thus far might suggest that the rise 
of the perpetual trust and the fall of the Rule against Perpetuities are bad 
things. The background, after all, is disturbing. Passage of the OST tax, cou-
pled with competition for highly mobile trust capital and trust business, has 
56. One Idaho attorney informed us that, the state income tax notwithstanding, a significant 
number of Idaho dynasty trusts have been established by nontesidents of Idaho, adding that for 
some of them the trust situs was changed to South Dakota for income tax reasons. Other preferred 
jurisdictions are Alaska and Delaware. E-mail correspondence between Ed Ahrens and James E. Krier 
(Feb. 19, 2003). Additional information on Idaho trusts was provided by a telephone conversation 
between Steve Martin, an Idaho attorney, and James E. Krier (Feb. 18, 2003 ); and e-mail correspondence 
between Greg Byron, an Idaho attorney, and James E. Krier (Feb. 20, 2003). Impressions on 
Wisconsin were provided by a telephone conversation between Louis Perlson, a Wisconsin attorney, 
and James E. Krier (Feb. 14, 2003 ). 
57. Letter from Jonathan G. Blattmachr to Jesse Dukeminier (July 9, 2002 ). 
58. Telephone conversation between Pierce McDowell, President, South Dakota Trust Com-
pany, and James E. Krier (Feb. 19, 2003); see Charles D. Fox IV & Michael J. Huft, Asset Protection 
and Dynasty Trusts, 37 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 287, 337-43 (2002). 
It may be possible for a dynasty trust created after 1986 in a state that does not permit perpetual 
trusts to be moved to a state permitting such trusts--through the exercise of a special power of appoint-
ment created in a donee. If the donee is given a power to remove the trustee or to appoint in further 
trust with a different trustee, the donee may move the trust to a perpetual-trust state. See SA 
AUSTIN W. SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS§ 635, at 452-53 (William Fratcher ed., 4th ed. 1989). 
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spurred state after state to abolish the Rule in one manner or another, and 
the trend shows no signs of abating.59 Notwithstanding all this activity, it 
appears that it was motivated not at all by any disenchantment with the 
Rule's central purpose of constraining the dead hand. As we have seen, perpet-
ual trusts were available in Idaho, South Dakota, and Wisconsin well before 
the GST tax, yet they were seldom drafted-perhaps because most people recog-
nized the hubris their use entailed.60 This absence of interest in perpetual trusts 
prior to the GST tax gives rise to the troubling likelihood that the Rule against 
Perpetuities is being abolished with little if any reflection upon the merits of 
the Rule on its own, without regard to tax considerations. The tax has thus far 
induced over a dozen states to switch from one legal regime to another, despite 
evidence that the first regime was in fact the oµe preferred-because if it were 
not, the switch could have been made in any event. 
But these observations, familiar ones having to do with the substitu-
tion effects of taxation,61 might be misleading. It could well be that the Rule 
against Perpetuities had grown outmoded, unpopular, and unwise well before 
the time of the GST tax, but not so troublesome as to be worth the effort of 
abolition. Reformers would no doubt have confronted considerable difficulties 
in organizing an effective campaign to abolish such an arcane doctrine, espe-
cially because only a relative handful of wealthy people would be the chief 
beneficiaries, and they could avail themselves of the law in the three bell-
wether states in any event. Then along came the GST tax and suddenly the 
perpetuities issue was not only salient-always of help to reformers-but sali-
ent among a larger and more powerful interest group, wealthy clients and 
their lawyers, banks, and trust companies.62 On this account, abolition of the 
Rule is pure serendipity. 
11. PROBLEMS AND PALLIATIVES 
The wisdom of abolishing the Rule against Perpetuities in the case of 
perpetual trusts has to turn on the merits of the Rule's underlying policies. 
59. Cf. Stewart E. Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts: Trust Law's Race w the Bottom!, 85 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1035, 1037-39 (2000). As John Langbein has nicely remarked to us, the OST tax proved to 
be "a natural predator" for the Rule against Perpetuities. 
60. In 2002, Nevada enacted legislation permitting perpetual trusts, subject to a popular vote 
in November 2002 to amend the state's constitutional prohibition of perpetuities. NEV. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 111.1037(7) (Michie Supp. 2001 ). The vote failed. 
61. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 523-24 (5th ed. 1998). 
62. Enactment of the OST tax worked a dramatic increase in federal estate taxes for the 
wealthy. The original estate tax allowed the well-advised rich to create successive life estates and 
thereby avoid taxes on the death of their descendants for several generations (about sixty to one 
hundred years, depending on the case). The OST tax, in contrast, imposes a 50 percent levy on 
family wealth at the end of each generation, or about every twenty-five years. 
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The policy analysis has to be done in context, because an argument that 
supports restrictions on perpetuities in general might carry little weight with 
respect to perpetual trusts. Let us begin with a sketch of what a typical perpet-
ual dynasty trust might look like. 
Here is an outline: 0 transfers $1.1 million to a trust that will pay the 
income to O's daughter, A, for life, then the trust principal is divided into 
separate shares for each of A's children. Each child allocated a trust share is 
given a life estate in that share, and upon the child's death, his or her trust 
share is further divided per stirpes to be held in trust for that child's issue. 
This process of dividing and subdividing on a stirpital basis continues down 
through the succeeding generations until one line runs out of issue, at 
which time the assets will be shifted to other branches of the family. To 
provide flexibility to deal with changing circumstances, A is given a special 
{or limited) power to appoint the trust principal during life or by will,63 
outright or in further trust, to any one or more of a class of persons consisting 
of A's spouse, the descendants of 0, and spouses of those descendants. This 
power permits A to modify or terminate the trust at any time during her life 
or at death by distributing the trust principal among her family. Each succes-
sive income beneficiary is given a special power of appointment over the 
share of the principal from which the beneficiary is receiving the income. 
The special power enables the beneficiaries, in succession, to modify or terminate 
their shares of the trust in any way that does not benefit the donees of the 
special powers.64 In addition, or in the alternative, the settlor may create as a 
dynasty trust a discretionary trust with discretionary powers in the trustee. 
A gift of $1.1 million put into a dynasty trust for descendants can grow 
into many millions. If the trustee invests $1. l million in common stocks, which 
appreciate in value at the same rate stocks have appreciated over the twentieth 
century,65 the original trust capital of $1.1 million will grow to over $200 mil-
lion in one hundred years (or, adjusted for inflation, to $10 million). In addi-
tion, there are several ways to increase the $1.1 million initial contribution 
into several million. If a settlor who creates a dynasty trust directs the trustee 
to buy insurance on the settlor's life with the $1.1 million gift, the trust 
assets will be considerably larger than $1.1 million at the settlor's death. If the 
settlor is age fifty and a standard risk, for example, the trustee can purchase 
63. Property subject to a special power of appointment is not subject to federal estate taxation 
at the death of the holder of the power, whereas property subject to a general power of appointment 
is. See infra text accompanying note 122. 
64. See infra text accompanying notes 121-122. 
65. See IBBOTZON ASSOCIATES, STOCKS, BoNDS, BILLS, AND INFLATION, 1995 Yearbook 
49 (noting a compound annual growth rate of 5.3 percent between 1925 and 1994); id. at 65 (report-
ing an inflation rate of 3.1 percent between 1925 and 1994). 
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$ 7 million worth of life insurance with a $1.1 million premium. If the settlor 
is sixty, the trustee can buy a policy paying $4.4 million. If the settlor's 
spouse joins in with a $1.1 million contribution to a policy payable on the 
death of the second to die, the policy proceeds could be worth many times 
these amounts on the survivor's death, depending on the spouses' ages. When 
the OST tax exemption rises to $3.5 million in 2009, these figures will more 
than triple. The perpetual tax-exempt dynasty trust thus offers extraordinary 
advantages in avoiding death taxes on descendarits.66 
We are now in a position to consider the policies underlying the Rule 
against Perpetuities-in the context of perpetual trusts. There are essentially 
three concems,67 each of which can be stated in terms of a problem arising 
from a persistent dead hand. The first, the problem of inalienability, is of 
little importance in our context because it can be avoided by any well-drafted 
trust. The second, which we shall call the problem of first-generation monop-
oly, is contentious; we shall satisfy ourselves simply with describing the 
competing outlooks. The third, the problem of duration, is a catch-all for a 
host of difficulties that can arise as an uncertain future unwinds, and it will 
require the bulk of our attention. 
A. The Problem of Inalienability 
Transferability (or "alienability") of property promotes efficiency; it 
allows the movement of resources from lower to higher valued uses through 
voluntary transactions between buyers and sellers that leave both sides of 
the bargain better off. So it is unsurprising that free alienability is one of the 
enduring principles of English, and subsequently American, property law. It 
was manifested early on in the Statute Quia Emptores,68 enacted in 1290 by 
the English Parliament. The statute provided that a free tenant could transfer 
his land to another person without the consent of his lord, who previously 
could veto the substitution of another tenant. But there was a counter thrust 
by the lords, who wanted to keep their land within the family, and over the 
years they searched for ways of preserving their land for their descendants, 
opposing the principle of free alienability. At the behest of the barons, 
66. See JONATHAN G. BLATIMACHR, THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO WEALTH PRESERVATION 
AND EsTATE PLANNING 238-44 (1999); James J. Costello Jr. & Anthony M. Vizzoni, Creating 
Dynasty Trusts: How New Jersey's Modified Rule Against Perpetuities Generates Powerful Estate 
Planning Techniques, N.J. L.J. 778 (2000); Dukeminier, supra note 35; Brian Layman, Comment, 
Perpetual Dynasty Trusts: One of the Most Powerful Tools in the Estate Planner's Arsenal, 32 AKRON 
L. REV. 747 (1999). 
67. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS pt. 1, introductory 
note (1983); LEWIS M. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY ANDTHE DEAD HAND 32-60 (1955). 
68. 18 Edw. 1, cc. 1-3 (1290). 
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Parliament enacted the statute de Donis Conditionalibus in 1285,69 prior to the 
Statute Quia Emptores. This statute authorized the creation of a fee tail, an 
estate in land that descends to the original fee tail tenant's lineal descendants 
generation after generation-in reality a perpetual series of life estates. In the 
two hundred years after the Statute de Donis, English judges came to dislike 
the inability of the fee tail tenant to cut out succession by his issue and sell 
the entailed land in fee simple. In order to promote alienability, they approved 
a method by which the tenant in tail could bar the entail.70 By bringing a col-
lusive lawsuit known as a common recovery, the fee tail tenant in possession 
could obtain a court decree awarding him a fee simple absolute, cutting off 
all rights of his issue and extinguishing any reversion or remainder. Later, the 
common recovery was abolished, and a tenant in tail was permitted to convey 
a fee simple by a deed. (Around the time of the American Revolution, the fee 
tail-which had become a toothless fetter on alienability-was abolished in 
almost all American states.) 
The lawyers for England's wealthy landed families turned next to another 
means to control inheritance; they began to create life estates in one genera-
tion, followed by contingent remainders in the next. Alienability was once 
again threatened, because contingent remainders are commonly unmarketable. 
The English judges responded, developing the law of future interests, and in 
particular a cluster of rules that destroyed the troublesome contingent 
remainders under certain Circumstances. 71 But executory interests, made possible 
by the Statute of Uses in 1536, avoided the constraints on contingent remain-
ders. So once again there was the threat of an infinite series of future interests 
that might remove land permanently from commerce. The judges invented 
the Rule against Perpetuities in response. Originating in the Duke of Norfolk's 
Case,72 the Rule developed over a century and a half into its modem form. 
Early on, it permitted transferors to control inheritance of the family estate 
for a period equal to the lives of persons they knew and whose competence 
they could judge, plus any actual minorities thereafter; later, the period of 
actual minorities turned into twenty-one years in gross. 
In the early years of the Rule against Perpetuities, future interests were 
usually in land, then the chief form of wealth in England, and the court's 
concern was with its alienability. But commerce expanded greatly in the latter 
half of the seventeenth century, money lending became socially respectable 
and government debt common, corporations grew and spread, a stock market 
69. 13 Edw. 1, cc. 1-50 (1285). 
70. Taltarum's Case, Y.B. 12 Edw. IV, 19 (1472). 
71. Principally the doctrine of destructibility of contingent remainders, and the rule in Shelley's 
Case. 
72. 22 Eng. Rep. 931 (Ch. 1681). 
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developed, and "the portion of the nation's total wealth consisting of land 
and other tangible things gradually declined, replaced more and more by 
mobile pieces of paper, representations of intangible fractions of a future 
stream of income."73 The rich began to pass this new intangible wealth from 
generation to generation, finding a convenient vehicle in the trust. 
In the United States today, the assets of the wealthy consist largely of 
personal property, not land. Transfers of personal property, and of land as well, 
for the benefit of succeeding generations are almost always in trust, and 
trustees almost always have a power to sell the trust property and invest in 
other assets. In almost all states permitting perpetual trusts, trustees must 
be given this power by the instrument if it is not granted by statute.74 A 
well-drafted trust will grant the power in any event. Hence, perpetual trusts 
do not give rise to a problem of inalienability; the trust assets are freely 
marketable. 75 
B. The Problem of First-Generation Monopoly 
Another sort of inalienability problem arises with perpetual successive life 
estates. Simes alluded to the problem in his attack on the wait-and-see doctrine, 
when he noted that "life estates ... are unmarketable, and may be said to be 
practically inalienable."76 His concern was not with the free marketability 
of the assets themselves, for he acknowledged that there is no difficulty in 
changing assets so long as a life estate is in trust with the trustee having a 
power of sale.77 What Simes had in mind instead is what we call the problem 
of first-generation monopoly, meaning by "first generation" the generation of 
the settlor who sets up a perpetual trust. Simes wrote: 
[l]t is good public policy to allow each person to dispose of his 
property as he pleases. The policy extends not only to the present 
generation but to future generations. If we are to permit the present 
generation to tie up all existing capital for an indefinitely long period 
of time, then future generations will have nothing to dispose of by will 
except what they have saved from their own income; and the property 
which each generation enjoys will already have been disposed of by 
ancestors long dead. The rule against perpetuities would appear to strike 
73. STUART BANNER, ANGLO-AMERICAN SECURITIES REGULATION 24 (1998). 
74. See supra notes 38-43. 
75. For discussion of this point in the context of trusts generally, see SIMES, supra note 67, 
at 32-54. Readers should bear in mind that this Article is about the Rule against Perpetuities in the 
context of perpetual trusts, not about the Rule generally. In most jurisdiction the Rule in one 
form or another remains in force with respect to such legal future interests as contingent remainders 
and executory interests, and we are not suggesting that this situation should be altered. 
76. Simes, supra note 9, at 193. 
77. Id. at 190-91. 
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a balance between the unlimited disposition of property by the members 
of the present generation and its unlimited disposition by members of 
f . 78 uture generations. 
This is an old and appealing sentiment. Simes himself cited Thomas Jefferson 
in support of it. 79 Adam Smith, one of the great founders of economics, 
expressed the sentiment in his attack on entails in Scotland, unaffected by 
England's Statute de Donis, which he considered to be "founded upon the 
most absurd of all suppositions, the supposition that every successive genera-
tion have not an equal right to the earth .... "80 
Simes, and no doubt all the other believers, thought that the force of 
the argument against first-generation monopoly "can scarcely be denied."81 
And yet it can. Professor Thomas Gallanis notes, for example, that sentiments 
about the dead hand rest on dubious assumptions about what people actually 
want.82 Conceding that some future trust beneficiaries would prefer outright 
ownership to an equitable life estate, he argues that hardly all of them would. 
Consider, for example, the likely preferences of the mentally incompetent; 
of minor children; of bad money managers who lack the discipline to lash 
themselves to the mast; of people (maybe those same people!) hounded by 
creditors and vulnerable to bankruptcy; of people, supported by the state, who 
are beneficiaries of discretionary trusts, which the state cannot touch; of people 
contemplating divorce and interested in having their property out of reach 
of the other half; of people who reap nice tax advantages from trusts, including 
spouses who benefit from the marital deduction, and beneficiaries of tax-
exempt dynasty trusts, among others. And even as to the class of those who 
would prefer their property outright, it isn't clear that the aggregate satisfaction 
of all class members, present and future combined, is increased by the Rule 
against Perpetuities.83 
Professor Gallanis also makes a normative point about sentiments regard-
ing the dead hand. The "balance" between the wishes of present and future 
78. Id. at 191-92. For a similar statement, see REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE 
TRANSFERS, at 8 (1983). 
79. SIMES, supra note 67, at 59 (noting that Jefferson, in a letter to James Madison, wrote "The 
earth belongs always to the living generation.") (quoting 5 PAUL LEICESTER FORD, WRITINGS OF 
THOMASJEFFERSON 115 (1895)). 
80. A.W.B. SIMPSON, LEGAL THEORY AND LEGAL HISTORY: EssAYS ON THE COMMON LAW 
157 (1987). 
81. SIMES, supra note 67, at 58. 
82. Thomas P. Gallanis, The Rule Against Perpetuities and the Law Commission's Flawed 
Philosophy, 59 CAMBRIDGE LJ. 284, 287-90 (2000); see also Note, Dynasty Trusts and the Rule Against 
Perpetuities, 116 HARV. L REV. 2588, 2603--08 (2003) (discussing ways in which dynasty trusts increase 
control by future generations). 
83. Cf. Jeffrey E. Stake, Darwin, Donations, and the Illusion of Dead Hand Control, 64 TUL. L 
REV. 705, 739-42 (1990). 
The Rise of the Perpetual Trust 1323 
property owners referred to by Simes84 is, in the view of Gallanis, too narrow 
in outlook. One should consider not just the satisfaction of present and future 
owners, but of present and future members of society generally, the haves 
and the have-nots alike. Beyond that, one should consider goals other than sat-
isfaction of preferences. A goal of equality, for example, might support placing 
restraints on the ability of one generation to limit the opportunities of the 
next; a goal of donative freedom, on the other hand, would cut in the opposite 
direction.85 Stephen Munzer is similarly skeptical about the normative support 
for controls on the dead hand, finding it "problematic to reduce the satisfac-
tion of a given generation in order to enhance that of future generations."86 
Gregory Alexander considers the intergenerational-balance argument "either 
1 . 1 b . l "87 tauto og1ca or so vague as to e meaning ess. 
Another approach to the first-generation monopoly problem is to think 
about its social and economic implications. Begin with arguments against 
inheritance generally, on the ground that it unjustifiably rewards the accident 
of a fortunate birth and deprives the unfortunate of equal opportunity.88 
Even supposing these are good arguments in general, they become problematic 
in the case of inheriting income from trusts. There is indeed a strong correla-
tion between income and successful competition in life, but income is not 
limited to inheritances; it includes earnings from work and from capital 
(savings). Capital wealth is quite unevenly distributed in this country; the 
wealthiest 1 percent of households own 30 to 40 percent of all assets.89 
Income, on the other hand, is far more evenly distributed. Over the last 
century there has been an extraordinary rise in earned income; of the total 
income in the United States, income from capital (including inherited wealth) 
declined from 55 percent in the 1920s, to 35 percent in the 1950s-1960s, to 
15 percent in the 1990s.90 Hardworking entrepreneurs have steadily 
replaced coupon clippers. Thus earnings provide a far greater share of the 
84. See supra text accompanying note 78. 
85. Gallanis, supra note 82, at 289-90. 
86. STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 220 ( 1990). 
87. Gregory S. Alexander, The Dead Hand and the Law of Trusts in the Nineteenth Century, 
37 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1257 (1985); see also John H. Langbein, Mandatory Rules in the Law of Trusts, 
at 11 n.25 (2003) (unpublished manuscript on file with the authors), stating that the notion of 
striking a fair balance between the wishes of present and future generations "is a slogan, 
explaining nothing." 
88. See BRUCE ACKERMAN & ANNE ALSTOTT, THE STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY 160 ( 1999). 
89. KEVIN PHILLIPS, WEALTH AND DEMOCRACY 122-23 (2002). 
90. THOMAS PIKETTY & EMMANUEL SAEZ, INCOME INEQUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES, 
1913-1998, at 14 (Nat'! Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8467, 2001). The authors 
do not separate income from capital into income from inherited capital and income from earned 
capital, so we cannot tell whether the income comes from an old or a new fortune, but it is clear 
that the share of income from inherited capital, compared to income from other sources, 
decreased dramatically in the twentieth century. 
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income necessary to offer equality of opportunity to children than does 
inherited wealth. 
Equality of opportunity in this country also owes a great debt to one of the 
most farsighted contributions to education established in the nineteenth cen-
tury: land-grant state universities with low tuition and scholarships, open to 
almost all on the basis of merit. In the late twentieth century, elite universities 
began need-blind admissions, admitting students on the basis of merit alone. 
Educational opportunities open to children without regard to the earnings 
of their parents increase equality of opportunity. 
Finally, equality of opportunity is not provided by income alone. As 
Professors Blum and Kalven pointed out years ago, the gravest source of inequal-
ity of opportunity is inequality of human capital, the knowledge and education 
embodied in individuals.91 Human capital is created by family cultural influence 
on children, as well as by education. The knowledge and education of parents 
and more remote ancestors are passed along from generation to generation. 
Judge Posner puts the point in another way: "The inheritance of a large 
amount of money may seem to confer an unfair advantage, but why more 
unfair than inheriting brains and energy ?"92 
Equal opportunity aside, there is an argument that trusts concentrate 
economic power in the rich or, more accurately, in the trustees for the rich. 
In the case of trusts, the trustees, not the beneficiaries, have the power of 
investment. They decide where the trust capital is to be invested, and are 
required to act prudently-for example, by diversifying trust holdings. 
Trustees tend to be conservative investors, perhaps in part because the 
conventional legal constraints have not allowed them to put money behind 
risky new enterprises As we shall see, however, this situation is changing.93 
In any event, the wealth invested by trustees is only a small fraction of the 
total amount of risk capital made available by other investors. There is no 
evidence that private trusts restricted to cautious investments harm the econ-
omy or give trustees undue economic power. 
Consider finally the argument that the certainty of receiving trust 
income makes beneficiaries lazy and unproductive. Alexander Hamilton is 
reported to have said that "we do not want a large leisure class in this country; 
91. Walter J. Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation, 19 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 417, 504 (1952). Cf. WILL&ARIELDURANT, THE LESSONS OF HISTORY 55 (1968) 
("The concentration of wealth is a natural result of this concentration of ability, and regularly recurs 
in history. The rate of concentration varies (other factors being equal) with the economic freedom 
permitted by morals and the laws .... [D]emocracy, allowing the most liberty, accelerates it."). 
92. POSNER, supra note 61, at 553. 
93. See infra text accompanying notes 132-137. 
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we want to give people an incentive to work."94 This nicely encapsulates the 
thinking of Franklin, Jefferson, and Adams as well. When the Republic was 
established, England had a "leisure class," composed of nobles and country 
gentlemen who lived off their land rents and inheritances and refrained 
from something as low as work. They looked down on commercial occupa-
tions as beneath them. "The eldest son inherited the land, the second son 
went into the military, another went into law, and the youngest son went 
into the church"---or so went the saying. To go into trade was not condoned. 
But this country has never had a leisure class like England's. We have no 
sense of inherited hierarchy. Our work ethic, deeply imbedded from the 
times of the Puritans, has spared us a class of great drones. 
We do not know exactly what percentage of the great fortunes was 
created by work and what percentage by inheritance. Various studies have 
produced different estimates and ongoing controversy among economists.95 
Of the four hundred richest persons in the United States, Forbes Magazine 
estimates that two-thirds are self-made and one-third inherited some or all 
of their wealth.96 Many inheritors of small fortunes have parlayed them into 
large ones, which makes estimating even harder. Clearly many inheritors enjoy 
working and making more money.97 They are not, by and large, unproductive. 
In this country, the work ethic is paired with another ethic: The rich 
should share their wealth with the less fortunate. 98 From the time when 
great fortunes were accumulated at the end of the nineteenth century to the 
94. Jim Lehrer News Hour (PBS television broadcast, June 14, 2002) (quote attributed to 
Alexander Hamilton by David Brooks, senior editor of The Weekly Standard). 
95. See Paul L. Menchik & Nancy A. Jianakoplos, Economics of Inheritance, in INHERITANCE 
AND WEALTH IN AMERICA 45, 51 (Robert K. Miller, Jr. & Stephen J. McNamee eds., 1998); see 
also STANLEY LEBERGOTT, THE AMERICAN ECONOMY: INCOME, WEALTH, AND WANT 161-75 
(1976) (concluding that 75 percent to 85 percent of the rich throughout American history were 
self-made); JAMES P. SMITH, UNEQUAL WEALTH AND INCENTIVES TO SAVE 16 (1995) (indicating 
in a statistical survey that for those in the top 5 percent of the richest, inheritances make up only 7 .5 
percent of their wealth). 
96. FORBES, Oct. 8, 2001, at 236, 251. 
97. Because of this, Professors Hirsch and Wang argue that the dead-hand rationale 
truly had merit only prior to the industrial age, when a fixed stock of land represented the 
main source of wealth .... [l]n modem times, when each generation can produce its own 
wealth, the loss of opportunity to bequeath prior wealth does not clearly crowd later comers 
to their overall detriment .... [A] legal regime permitting unlimited future interests gives 
each generation the opportunity to bequeath new wealth only, but with the longest duration 
of control; and each generation will also have the maximum incentive to produce new 
bequeathable wealth. 
Adam J. Hirsch & William K.S. Wang, A Qualitative Theory of the Dead Hand, 68 IND. L.J. l, 17-18 
(1992). Hirsch and Wang conclude that in a dynamic wealth-producing society the generational 
equity argument has no merit. Id. at 16. 
98. See FRANCIE 0STROWER, WHY THE WEALTHY GIVE 132-34 (1995) (concluding that 
philanthropy gives an elite social status and legitimates the wealth). 
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present, the American rich, to justify their moral instinct, have given great 
sums to philanthropic enterprises. John D. Rockefeller built the University of 
Chicago and Rockefeller University in Manhattan; Andrew Carnegie built 
libraries across the country; Henry Clay Frick, Andrew Mellon, and others 
founded great art museums; Henry Ford created the Ford Foundation, which 
has spent hundreds of millions attacking the systemic causes of poverty. This 
tradition of giving, reflecting conceptions about how society should be 
organized and what benefits the public, continues to this day. The newest 
billionaires, Bill and Melinda Gates, have established a foundation with 
assets exceeding $23 billion, the largest philanthropic foundation in the 
country, for the purpose of supporting initiatives in health and learning in 
the global community.99 The lesser rich too give considerable sums to charity, 
unlike the rich in Britain.'00 This charitable support has given us in the 
United States universities and hospitals and cultural institutions that are the 
envy of the world. 101 The diversity of privately supported philanthropic enter-
prises is enormous, far greater than in Western European countries where 
the charitable agenda is largely set and supported by the government. 
But perhaps this final argument has been pushed off center. Perhaps 
the objection is to the creation of family dynasties, which receive trust income 
99. BILL AND MELINDA GA TES FOUNDATION, Bringing Innovations in Health and Leaming to 
the Global Community, at http://www.gatesfoundation.org/AboutUs/. 
100. Comparing the endowments of American and British universities is eye opening. 
"Harvard has an endowment revealed last year of $18.3 [billion]-more than double the endowment 
of all UK universities. The top 20 U.S. universities all have an endowment of more than $1 [billion]. 
Oxbridge [Oxford, Cambridge, University College London, and Imperial College]-universities 
and colleges together-has an estimated ... 4 billion pounds [$5.8 billion] between them." Will 
Woodward, Universities in Crisis, GUARDIAN (London), May 22, 2002, at 8; see also John Elliott & 
Rosie Waterhouse, Why Oxford Is Going Begging, SUNDAY TIMES (London), Mar. 31, 2002, at 1 
(reporting that the endowment of the Oxford colleges totals $1.8 to $2.2 billion). 
Another article in the London Sunday Times reported that more than half of Dartmouth 
graduates give something to the college, whereas the most successful Oxbridge college had alumni 
contributions of not above 12 percent. Paul Durman, Bosses Should Go into the Business of Philan-
thropy, SUNDAY TIMES (London), Aug. 19, 2001, at 6. Durnam reports that "(i]n America, the very 
rich are much more generous" in charitable giving, and quotes one new British philanthropist as 
saying, "The English can be a bit mean [about gifts to charity]. They would rather be lords of the 
manor or buy a football club." Id. 
These newspaper articles all conclude that the British universities are falling behind American 
universities quite rapidly, both in hiring the best teachers and in attracting the best students. 
Ironically, Americans may come to the rescue. The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation gave $210 
million in 2000 to Cambridge University to endow a scholarship program. 
101. The immense amount of money contributed to scientific research in this country has 
resulted in a raft of Nobel awards. In the 50 year period between 1950 and 2000, Americans have 
won or shared the Nobel prize 73 times in physiology or medicine, 63 times in physics, and 40 times 
in chemistry. In the 33 year period between 1969 and 2000, the Nobel prize in economics has been 
won or shared by an American 30 times. THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 2002, 
692-94 (William A. McGeveran, Jr., ed., 2002). 
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generation after generation. The answer is this: The Rule against Perpetuities 
has not prevented the creation of family dynasties. Witness the Rockefellers 
(now in their fifth generation), the Du Pants of high dynastic numbering 
(whose fortune dates from the War of 1812), and the Mellons (with a 
fortune predating the Civil War). These are extreme cases, but the fact is that 
smaller fortunes have supported many other families over several generations. 
Dozens of the lesser rich families have entrenched themselves from generation 
to generation in communities across the United States. The same is true in 
England, where the Rule against Perpetuities has not prevented the great 
families from maintaining their power and wealth for centuries. If family 
dynasties are to be prevented, only the federal government, through income 
and death taxes, can do it. As Susan French has noted, the power of the dead 
hand is always at the sufferance of the living, who are perfectly free to change 
the laws that created the power in the first place.102 
C. The Problem of Duration 
The longer trusts endure, the more troublesome they become, thanks 
largely to uncertainty. The problem is not peculiar to perpetual trusts; it 
arises in the case of long-term trusts generally, including trusts in full 
compliance with the Rule against Perpetuities. Because the Rule tolerates con-
tingencies that might persist as long as a hundred years or so, there has 
always been a need for other means to deal with unforeseen exigencies, and 
courts and lawyers developed them. The means remain available, even where 
the Rule has been abolished. The issue is their effectiveness in coping with the 
most significant difficulties. 
1. Change in Circumstances 
No one can foresee the future. After some years pass, events never antici-
pated by trust settlors and their lawyers are likely to occur-for example, changes 
in the number, needs, and abilities of beneficiaries; changes in tax law and 
trust doctrine; changes in investment opportunities, in the rate of inflation 
and the value of the dollar; changes in trustees and the quality of their 
performance. The welfare of beneficiaries might be reduced in consequence, 
or economic waste might result. The Rule against Perpetuities mitigates the 
difficulty by finally terminating trusts and forcing distribution of assets. 103 
102. See Susan F. French, Perpetuities: Three Essays in Honor of My Father, 65 WASH. L. REV. 323, 
350-52 (1990). 
103. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: 00NATIVE TRANSFERS, at 9 (1983) 
(noting that the Rule against Perpetuities responds to problem of circumstances unforeseen by the 
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Absent the Rule, termination or modification after a change in circumstances 
must be dealt with in other ways. 
One option, termination or modification by a court, is only grudgingly 
available to beneficiaries, at least according to the majority rule set down in 
Claflin v. Claflin.' 04 The Claflin doctrine holds that a trust may not be termi-
nated by a court prior to the time fixed for termination, even though all the 
beneficiaries consent, if ending the trust prematurely would be contrary to a 
material purpose of the settlor. A material purpose is generally found in the 
case of a spendthrift trust, a discretionary or support trust, or a trust postpon-
ing distribution of principal until beneficiaries reach a given age. 
Judicial modification of the dispositive provisions of a trust is also difficult 
to obtain. For example, the Restatement (Second) of Trusts provides that: 
The court will direct or permit the trustee to deviate from a term of the 
trust if owing to circumstances not known to the settlor and not antici-
pated by him compliance would defeat or substantially impair the 
accomplishment of the purposes of the trust; and in such case, if necessary 
to carry out the purposes of the trust, the court may direct or permit 
the trustee to do acts which are not authorized or are forbidden by the 
terms of the trust. 105 
A Comment to this provision states that a court should not "permit or 
direct the trustee to deviate from the terms of the trust merely because such 
deviation would be more advantageous to the beneficiaries than a compli-
ance with such direction."106 
The Restatement (Second) reflects an outmoded view of the world, 
based on a sentiment that Adam Smith called "piety to the dead."107 The 
Restatement provision assumes that a settlor would not want a deviation if 
its only purpose were to make trust beneficiaries better off, notwithstanding 
that most trusts are set up for just that reason-to provide advantages for 
beneficiaries by way of tax savings, competent management, protection from 
creditors, and so forth. The trust provisions, created at a given time, presuma-
bly aim to advantage the beneficiaries under the circumstances as they 
existed at that time. No one can see how circumstances will change, but we 
can reasonably suppose that, whatever happens, settlors would rather hold 
to the beneficial purposes of their trust than to precise terms that have come 
settlor); POSNER, supra note 61, at 560 (explaining that the Rule helps avoid inefficient use of 
resources brought about by unforeseen contingencies); Robert C. Ellickson, Adverse Possession and 
Perpetuities Law: Two Dents in the Uberrarian Model of Property Rights, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 723, 736 
(1986) (arguing that the Rule effectively limits problems of multiple owners). 
104. 20 N.E. 545 (Mass. 1889). 
105. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS§ 167(1) (1959). 
106. Id. cmt. b. 
107. ADAM SMITH, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 64 (R.L. Meek et al. eds., 1978). 
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to be inconsistent with those purposes, given subsequent events. Trust law 
needs modernizing in this respect, and the decline of the Rule against Perpetui-
ties makes the need more acute. We have to discard the nineteenth-century 
idea, developed largely in ancestor-worshiping Massachusetts ("where the 
Lowells talk to the Cabots, and the Cabots talk only to God"), that trusts are 
written in stone by an omniscient settlor. 
The situation in England is quite different.108 At the behest of trust bene-
ficiaries who urgently sought to modify trusts to escape serious tax 
disadvantages resulting from changes in the tax laws, Parliament enacted 
the Variation of Trusts Act of 1958,109 which greatly expanded the power of 
courts to modify or terminate trusts. The act provides that a court may 
consent to modification or termination of a trust on behalf of incompetent, 
minor, or unborn beneficiaries whenever the court finds it to the beneficiaries' 
advantage. The function of the court is to protect those who cannot protect 
themselves, considering educational and social benefits, and reduction in 
family dissension, as well as financial benefits.ll0 The settlor's intent is a rele-
vant but not controlling consideration.1ll 
Recently, the American Law Institute and the Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws have taken steps to relax the Claflin doctrine. Both 
the Restatement (Third) of Trustsm and the Uniform Trust Code113 adhere 
to the doctrine's requirement that modification or termination be not 
inconsistent with a material purpose of the trust, but, as the oft-used adage 
goes, they pour new wine in old bottles.114 In order to be material, the 
108. In Saunders v. Vautier, 49 Eng. Rep. 282 (Ch. 1841), the English court held that a trust can 
be terminated at any time if all the beneficiaries are adult and sui juris and consent. Unfortunately 
the English courts took a far more restrictive view of judicial power to modify trusts. In Chapman 
v. Chapman, A.C. 429 (H.L. 1954 ), the House of Lords held that courts could modify trusts only in 
extremely limited circumstances. Chapman was overruled by the English Variation of Trusts Act of 
1958. 
109. Variation ofT rusts Act, 1958, 6 & 7 c. 53, § 1; see GRAHAM MOFFA TI, TRUSTS LAW: TEXTS 
AND MATERIALS 262-73 (3d ed. 1999). 
110. In a memorable opinion, refusing to modify a trust for tax advantages that would result 
from moving the minor beneficiaries to the Isle of Jersey, Lord Denning said: "There are many 
things in life more worth-while than money. One of these things is to be brought up in this our 
England, which is still 'the envy of less happier lands'. I do not believe it is for the benefit of children 
to be uprooted from England and transported to another country simply to avoid tax." Re Weston's 
Settlements, 3 All E.R. 338, 342 (C.A. 1968). 
111. See Re Remnant's Settlement Trusts, 2 All E.R. 554, 559 (Ch. 1970). 
112. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS§ 65 (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2001). 
113. UNIFORM TRUST CODE§ 4ll(b) (2000) (amended 2001). 
114. See generally Ronald Chester, Modification and Tennination of Trusts in the 21st Century: The 
Uniform Trust Code Leads a Quiet Revolution, 35 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 697 (2001); Julia C. 
Walker, Note, Get Your Dead Hands Off Me: Beneficiaries' Right to Terminate or Modify a Trust Under 
the Uniform Trust Code, 67 Mo. L. REV. 443 (2002). 
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purpose must be of some substantial significance. The Restatement (Third) 
says: 
Material purposes are not readily to be inferred. A finding of such a pur-
pose generally requires some showing of a particular concern or objective 
on the part of the settlor, such as concern with regard to the beneficiary's 
management skills, judgment, or level of maturity. Thus a court may look 
for some circumstantial or other evidence indicating that the trust 
arrangement represented to the settlor more than a method of allocat-
ing the benefits of property among multiple beneficiaries, or a means 
of offering to the beneficiaries (but not imposing on them) a particular 
advantage. Sometimes, of course, the very nature or design of a trust sug-
. . h . l 115 gests its protecttve nature or some ot er matena purpose. 
Both the Code and the Restatement (Third) provide that a spendthrift 
clause prohibiting alienation of the beneficiaries' interests is not presumed 
to constitute a material purpose of the trust. 116 Moreover, both apply the 
"equitable deviation doctrine" to dispositive trust provisions, empowering 
trustees to deviate from the administrative and investment provisions of a 
trust because of circumstances not anticipated by the settlor. 117 The Code 
buttresses its positions by stating that "[a] trust and its terms must be for the 
benefit of its beneficiaries."118 
Another limitation on the judicial power of modification needs to be 
noted. Following some pioneering Massachusetts cases allowing trust modifi-
cation after the settlor's death to achieve the settlor's tax objectives,119 Uniform 
Trust Code section 416 permits judicial modification of defectively drafted 
trusts. Section 416 does not appear to authorize modification to meet the tax 
objectives of the beneficiaries which arise after the settlor's death. And no 
cases yet permit this. 
If the Code or the Restatement (Third) is adopted, courts will have a 
much greater latitude in modifying trusts than they have now under the Claflin 
doctrine. Even then, however, modification or termination by a court will be 
115. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS§ 65 cmt. d, cited approvingly in UNIFORM TRUST 
CODE,§ 411 cmt. 
116. UNIFORM TRUST CODE§ 41 l(c); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS§ 65 cmt. e. 
11 7. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 66 cmt. b: "Upon a showing of changed circum-
stances, or a petitioner's credible presentation that relevant circumstances were unknown to the 
settlor, the burden of persuasion shifts to the person(s) seeking to show that the circumstances were 
anticipated by the settlor during the formulation and execution of the trust." See also UNIFORM 
TRUST CODE§ 412. 
118. UNIFORM TRUST CODE § 404. We leave it to the reader to decide whether this provi-
sion is consistent with the relaxed Claflin doctrine adopted by the Uniform Trust Code. See also 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS§ 27 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1999). 
119. Walker v. Walker, 744 N.E.2d 60, 65 (2001) (citing earlier cases). Uniform Trust Code 
section 416 is copied from The Restatement (Third) of Property: Donative Transfers section 12.2 (2003 ). 
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more limited than in England, where it is not necessary to show a change in 
circumstances, as it is in this country. All that is required in England is that 
the modification or termination be deemed beneficial to the beneficiaries. 
The modification and termination provisions of the Uniform Trust Code 
and the Restatement (Third) seem likely to prove satisfactory for most trusts 
governed by the common law Rule against Perpetuities. The restrictions on 
modification and termination, derived from the Claflin doctrine, will end, 
at the latest, after lives-in-being plus twenty-one years. With a perpetual 
trust, however, the restrictions will go on forever. Even though perpetual trusts 
were one of the most significant trust developments of the late twentieth 
century, they are not mentioned in the Uniform Trust Code. It should be 
amended to apply different modification and termination rules to perpetual 
trusts. 120 
Judicial modification or termination of a trust can be costly. A lawsuit 
is required; legal fees, perhaps including legal fees for guardians ad litem 
representing minor, disabled, and unascertained beneficiaries, must be paid. 
Inasmuch as it will often be doubtful whether a court will be moved to 
terminate or modify a trust, beneficiaries may be reluctant to incur liability 
for legal fees in a risky lawsuit. In forcing a fixed termination point for 
trusts, the Rule against Perpetuities has played a useful role--one it would 
be good to replicate through legislation creating means that would allow 
beneficiaries to modify or terminate trusts without court intervention. 
Skilled estate planners can get around some of the limitations of judicial 
modification and termination of trusts through the creation of powers of 
appointment-general or special-in trust beneficiaries. A general power of 
apJXJintment enables a donee of the power to modify or terminate a trust in favor 
of the donee, the donee's creditors, the donee's estate, or the creditors of the 
donee's estate. A general power is treated under the Internal Revenue Code 
as ownership of the appointive property, meaning that the trust principal is 
included in the donee's taxable gross estate. For this reason, general powers of 
appointment are created almost exclusively in spouses of the donor, together 
with a life estate, to qualify the gift for the marital deduction. 121 The appointive 
property is not included in the decedent spouse's estate but is included in the 
surviving spouse's estate when she dies because she holds a general JXJwer over it. 
120. THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSfS ch. 13, introductory note, dodges the issue: "It 
is worth noting, however, that this section [on modification and termination of trusts) applies in the 
common-law context and that different issues-and different planning and drafting considera-
tions-may arise with respect to trusts of indefinite duration in jurisdictions that have adopted 
legislation to abolish the rule against perpetuities." 
121. l.R.C. § 2041(b) (1994). A marital deduction is also allowed for a qualified terminable 
interest property trust, which is a trust giving the surviving spouse a life estate only. Id. § 2056(b)(7). 
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A special power of appointment (sometimes called a limited or nongen-
eral power) is a power to appoint to a class of persons that does not include 
the donee of the power, the donee's creditors, the donee's estate, or the credi-
tors of the donee's estate. Special powers most often permit appointment to 
the donor's descendants and the descendants' spouses. In contrast to a general 
power, special powers are not treated as ownership under the Internal Revenue 
Code,122 so they bring flexibility to a trust at no tax cost. They permit the 
holders of the power to terminate an interest, or to modify trust terms, includ-
ing terms designating beneficiaries, as may be desirable. Many changes in 
circumstances--unexpected deaths, marriages, divorces, remarriages, children 
with special needs, children with disabilities, changes in the tax laws-can 
be dealt with by special powers of appointment. The skilled estate planner 
may give the life tenant a special power of appointment or, if the life tenant 
is unsuitable because incompetent or because of adverse personal relations with 
remaindermen (stepparents, for example), create a special power of appoint-
ment in a remainderman. 
Of course, many trusts are not drafted by expert estate planners. With 
respect to these, the beneficiaries are stuck with meeting the requirements 
of the Claflin doctrine in order to modify or terminate the trust. Even powers 
that are created by experts are often too narrowly drawn. Sometimes, for 
example, they can be exercised only by will, which means the trust cannot 
be modified or terminated until the donee of the power dies. 
Although powers of appointment bring flexibility, as time goes on suc-
cessive powers cannot be exercised in a trust without adverse estate tax 
consequences under Internal Revenue Code section 2041(a)(3).123 Under the 
orthodox Rule against Perpetuities, exercises of special powers are read back 
into the original trust instrument creating the trust. The donee of the power 
is viewed as the agent of the donor. Any interest created by an exercise of a 
special power must vest or fail within lives-in-being at the creation of the 
trust, plus twenty-one years, or the interest is invalid. At one time, Delaware 
had a statute providing that the exercise of a special power began a new 
perpetuities period, and all interests had to vest or fail within lives-in-being 
at the time of exercise of the power, not at the creation of the power, plus 
twenty-one years. 124 Thus it was possible in Delaware to create a perpetual 
trust through the creation of successive special powers of appointment. 
122. Treas. Reg.§ 20.2041-l(c)(l) (1958). 
123. l.R.C. § 204l(a)(3) (1994). 
124. Delaware repealed this statute in 2000. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 504 (Michie Supp. 
2000), provides that any interest created by a special power of appointment shall be deemed to have 
been created at the time of the creation rather than of its exercise. 
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Congress responded by enacting section 2041 (a)(3) of the Internal 
Revenue Code. The section provides that the donee's gross taxable estate shall 
include the value of the appointive assets if the donee exercises a special power 
"by creating another power of appointment which under the applicable local 
law can be validly exercised so as to postpone the vesting of any estate or 
interest in such property, or suspend the absolute ownership or power of 
alienation of such property, for a period ascertainable without regard to the date 
of the creation of the first power."125 This statute means that if 0 creates a special 
power of appointment in her daughter, A, in, say, 2000, and if in 2025 A exer-
cises a special power of appointment by creating in her son, B, another 
special power of appointment, and the perpetuities period that governs B's 
exercise of the power is not calculated from the date the trust is created 
(2000), the trust assets are taxable in A's federal gross estate. This section of 
the Code, applicable in all states, is called the Delaware Tax Trap because it was 
enacted to close the loophole in Delaware that permitted trusts to avoid the 
estate tax forever through the use of successive powers of appointment. 
In a jurisdiction that has repealed the common law Rule against Perpetui-
ties and substituted a rule against suspension of the power of alienation, 
with a proviso that the power of alienation is not suspended if the trustee 
has a power of sale, it is impossible for section 204 l(a)(3) to apply. The power 
of alienation is not suspended at all, and therefore an exercise of a power 
does not suspend the power of alienation for a period of time that cannot be 
ascertained by referring back to the creation of the trust. 126 Thus successive spe-
cial powers of appointment can be created indefinitely in these states, without 
the trust property being included in the donee's taxable gross estate. 127 
On the other hand, in a jurisdiction that has abolished the Rule against 
Perpetuities, or made it inapplicable to perpetual trusts, and has not adopted a 
rule against suspension of the power of alienation, there is no perpetuities 
period beginning at the creation of the trust within which the appointed inter-
ests must vest. If a statute permitting a perpetual trust does not require that the 
beneficial interests created by the exercise of a special power must vest within 
a period beginning with the trust's creation, the value of the trust principal is 
included in the donee's taxable gross estate. 128 Therefore, in the preceding 
125. I.R.C. § 2041(a)(3) (1994) (emphasis added). 
126. Estate of Murphy v. Commissioner, 71T.C.671, 674 (1979). 
127. This is true in Alaska, Idaho, New Jersey, South Dakota, and Wisconsin, which have only 
a rule against suspension of the power of alienation and a proviso that the power of alienation is not 
suspended if the trustee has a power of sale. See supra notes 37-40. 
128. This appears to be true in Arizona, Delaware, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Missouri, 
Nebraska, Ohio, Rhode Island, and Virginia. See supra notes 41-45. 
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example, an exercise of a special power by A creating another special power in 
B requires the inclusion of the trust property in A's federal gross estate. 
Another way of avoiding Internal Revenue Code section 204l(a)(3) is to 
provide that a special power must be exercised within a very long period of 
years beginning at the creation of the trust. Alaska, Florida, Washington, and 
Wyoming have done this, and apparently avoided section 204l{a){3) for the 
time specified in the local statute. 129 
Except in Alaska, Florida, Idaho, New Jersey, South Dakota, Washington, 
Wisconsin, and Wyoming, the usefulness of special powers in bringing flexibility 
to a trust is basically limited to lives-in-being at the creation of the trust plus 
twenty-one years. After this period expires, the heavy tax cost on the creation of 
special powers eliminates their usefulness. After that time, the beneficiaries must 
rely on the power of a court to modify or terminate the trust, on discretionary 
powers given the trustee, or on powers in the beneficiaries to remove and replace 
a trustee. 
Another way to create flexibility in a trust is by giving a trustee 
discretionary powers: for example, to distribute income and principal among 
the beneficiaries as the trustee sees fit, to make alterations to accommodate 
changes in the tax laws, or to terminate the trust. 
A power of appointment in a trust beneficiary is not subject to fiduciary 
obligations and may be exercised arbitrarily within the scope of the power. A 
discretionary power in a trustee, however, is a fiduciary power subject to judicial 
control to prevent abuse of discretion. The permissible income beneficiaries and 
the presumptive remaindermen have standing to bring an action against the 
trustee for abuse of discretion. Even a trust instrument granting the trustee "sole" 
or "absolute and uncontrolled" discretion may not protect the trustee from a 
lawsuit by a disgruntled beneficiary. As Judge Learned Hand remarked: 
[N]o language, however strong, will entirely remove any power held in 
trust from the reach of a court of equity. After allowance has been made 
for every possible factor which could rationally enter into the trustee's 
decision, if it appears that he has utterly disregarded the interests of the 
beneficiary, the Court will intervene. Indeed were that not true, the 
129. ALASKA STAT.§ 34.27.051(a) (Lexis 2002) (stating that interests created by exercising a 
special power must vest within one thousand years from creation of the trust); FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 689.225(2)(£) (West Supp. 2003) (vesting within 360 years from trust creation); WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN.§ 11.98.130 (West Supp. 2003) (vesting within 150years from trust creation); WYO. H.B. 77 
(2003) (vesting within one thousand years from trust creation). The Alaska statute was purposely 
designed to circumvent Internal Revenue Code section 204l(a)(3) (1994). See Stephen E. Geer, The 
Alaska Dynasty Trust, 18 ALASKA L. REV. 253, 281--82 (2001). 
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power would not be held in trust at all; the language would be no more 
h d . . 130 t an a precatory a momt1on. 
Because there is personal liability for breach of fiduciary obligation, a trustee 
may be reluctant to modify a trust in ways that favor the income beneficiaries on 
the one hand, or the remaindermen on the other, unless all beneficiaries agree 
to the change. In most cases, however, the remaindermen will be unascertained, 
making such an agreement impossible. But the living beneficiaries can put 
pressure on the trustee to modify the trust if they are given a power to remove the 
trustee. If a beneficiary of a discretionary trust can be appointed trustee by the 
beneficiaries, the beneficiaries have a general power of appointment, with 
resultant adverse tax consequences, because the trustee selected by the benefi-
ciaries can distribute the trust property to the beneficiaries. If, however, a bene-
ficiary cannot be named trustee, the beneficiaries may be given the power to 
appoint a successor trustee, without adverse tax consequences, provided that the 
successor trustee is not related or subordinate to the beneficiaries. 131 
A trustee may be reluctant to exercise a power to terminate a trust, 
unless the trust has become impractical or uneconomical to administer, because 
termination deprives the trustee of his fees. Similarly, a trustee might be reluc-
tant to make distributions of principal which will reduce the base upon which 
fees are figured. A power in the beneficiaries to remove and replace a trustee, 
given them by the trust instrument, may make the trustee more amenable and 
lessen the inefficiencies. 
2. Trustees 
Any number of problems can arise with trustees, and the longer a trust 
lasts, the greater the burden of these. Consider trust investments. There is an 
old saw in the banking business: "How do you make a small fortune? Give a bank 
a large one to manage in trust." Trustees have long been risk averse, conservative 
investors, reducing the return to the beneficiaries, particularly in an inflationary 
economy such as we have experienced over the twentieth century .132 
130. Stix v. Commissioner, 152 F.2d 562, 563 (2d Cir. 1945); see also REsTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TRUSTS§ SO ( 1959), for extensive discussion of discretionary powers. 
131. REV. RUL. 95-58, 1995-2 C.B. 2. 
132. As one commentator has observed: 
It's simple mathematics: If you invested $1 in 1952 and your investment kept pace with the 
rate of inflation-nothing more, nothing less-that dollar would be worth $5.29 today. That's a 
429% increase. 
So how come the $2-million trust fund a Berkeley woman and six members of her family 
inherited in 1952 is worth "only" $3.2 million today-a 63% rate of return over the last four 
decades. 
Lewis Beale, An Heir-Raising Enterprise, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1992, at El. 
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In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, most states maintained 
statutory lists of investments suitable for trustees. These usually included gov-
ernment bonds, first mortgages, and preferred stocks. Investment in common 
stock was severely restricted. Courts also required trustees to look first at the 
safety of investments. Preservation of the principal was the primary object. 
Speculation was strictly forbidden. The "prudent man" investor rule, first formu-
lated by the Massachusetts court in Harvard College v. Amory, 133 purported 
to liberalize the rules for trustee investment. The rule dispensed with legal 
lists but prohibited investments "for the purpose of speculation" and continued 
to emphasize the safety of capital. From the 1930s through the 1960s, a majority 
of states replaced legal list statutes with the prudent man rule. Nonetheless, 
trustees continued to be conservative investors. Settlors could authorize the 
trustee to use discretion in investing, but permissive investment powers were 
construed narrowly by courts, which held the settlor could not have meant 
to authorize speculative investments. Because courts judged investments with 
20-20 hindsight, it was easy for them to decide any investment was speculative. 
In the late twentieth century, the prudent man investor rule came under 
severe criticism.1.14 As a result, a new "prudent investor" rule was formulated 
and incorporated first in the Restatement (Third) of Trustsrn and later in the 
Prudent Investor Act.u6 The prudent investor rule is based on modem portfo-
lio theory. It increases the freedom of trustees to choose investments based 
on the traditional duties of care, skill, and caution. They can put together a 
balanced portfolio of diversified investments, which may include investments 
with more risks than would be permitted under the prudent man rule because 
the whole portfolio is evaluated, not each specific investment. The word 
"speculation" does not appear in the new rule. Commentators are hopeful that 
this liberalization of permitted trustee investments will increase the total 
return from the trust principal.137 The prudent investor rule has been adopted 
by about three-fourths of the states, and many of the rest have provisions 
patterned on the uniform rule or on the Restatement (Third). This should 
133. 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446, 461 (1830). 
134. See John H. Langbein & Richard A. Posner, Market Funds and Trust Investment Law, 
1976 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1, 3-6 (1976); Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Puzzling Persistence of the Constrained 
Prudent Man Rule, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 52 (1987); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS, Topic 5, 
Investment of Trust Funds. 
135. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS§ 227. 
136. UNIFORM PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT§ 2 (2000). 
13 7. For an excellent summary of trust investment rules and an empirical study encouraging 
hope for increased trustee returns, see generally Martin D. Begleiter, Does the Prudent Investor Need 
the Uniform Prudent Investor Act-An Empirical Study of Trust Investment Practices, 51 ME. L. REV. 
27 (1999). 
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help considerably in dealing with the problem of unduly cautious investments 
by trustees. 
Trustees' fees are another problem. Trustees are paid for managing the trust 
principal. Corporate trustees usually use graduated fee schedules, charging 
around 1 percent on the first $1 million of principal, with declining percent-
ages for additional millions. Some trustees charge a percentage of the value 
of income earned as well, some charge a minimum annual fee, and some add 
on a charge for distribution of principal during the term of a trust and upon 
its termination.138 Beyond this, trustees usually have legal counsel to advise 
them on problems arising during the term of the trust, resulting in further 
fees. These charges combined can significantly reduce the overall return on 
trust investments, and perhaps with no offsetting gains. Trust beneficiaries 
may be able to procure equally good management of assets, and at a much 
lower cost, by investing in index funds. They have this option when a trust 
terminates and the principal is distributed-but perpetual trusts don't usually 
terminate (absent judicial or statutory relief or exercise of a power of 
• ) 139 appointment . 
Accounting fees are yet another cost, which can be increased by legal 
fees in connection with an accounting, including fees of guardians ad litem for 
incapacitated or unascertained beneficiaries. Accounting requirements vary 
from state to state.140 In some jurisdictions, trustees of testamentary trusts must 
account annually to the court, with attendant legal fees. In others, trustees 
may ask for court approval every four or five years. Trustees like to have 
their accounts approved after a short period of time. A trustee unknowingly 
engaging in a trust violation wants to limit its liability by means of a timely 
judicial determination. Trustees of inter vivas trusts may be permitted to 
account annually to the beneficiaries, particularly if the trust instrument so 
provides, avoiding costly court accountings. Whenever a new trustee replaces 
an old trustee, an accounting is necessary to terminate the liabilities of the old 
trustee. 
Beneficiaries dissatisfied with a trustee because of the fees charged or 
for some other reason have rather limited remedies. The standard rule is that 
a trustee, in whom the settlor supposedly reposed special confidence, cannot 
be removed unless guilty of a breach of trust or shown to be otherwise unfit; 
138. CHARLES E. ROUNDS, JR., LORING: A TRUSTEE'S HANDBOOK§ 8.4 (2003). 
139. Statutes in a number of states provide for the termination of trusts when the value of the 
trust principal becomes so small that it is uneconomic to continue the trust. See, e.g., UNIFORM 
TRUST CODE § 414 (2000) (amended 2001 ). 
140. For comprehensive lists of state statutes regulating the duty of the trustee to account, 
see AMY MORRIS HESS, GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF 
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES§§ 965-968 (2000). 
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mere dissatisfaction on the part of beneficiaries is not enough.141 This lessens 
competition among trust companies and presumably contributes to higher fees. 
When settlors choose a trustee, they cannot know the course of future 
events. This might well lead them to choose a corporate trustee instead of a 
trusted friend, if for no other reason than that friends eventually die. But then, 
so too do corporate trustees, in a sense. Their employees pass on, or away; the 
corporate trustee itself may merge with another company; entire inventories 
of trust accounts are routinely bought and sold by banks. Beneficiaries, 
especially beneficiaries of long-term and perpetual trusts, may end up with a 
trustee of a sort the settlor would never have wished to choose-such as a bank 
the beneficiaries find to be distant, cold, and unresponsive to their needs. 
The Uniform Trust Code broadens the grounds for removing a trustee. It 
provides that a court may remove a trustee if, "because of unfitness, unwilling-
ness, or persistent failure of the trustee to administer the trust effectively, the 
court determines that removal of the trustee best serves the interests of the bene-
ficiaries."142 The term '"unwillingness' includes not only cases where the trustee 
refuses to act but also a pattern of indifference to some or all of the benefi-
ciaries"; "[a] 'persistent failure to administer the trust effectively' might include a 
long-term pattern of mediocre performance, such as consistently poor 
investment results when compared to comparable trusts."143 The Uniform Trust 
Code further provides that if there has been a substantial change of circum-
stances or all the beneficiaries ask for removal, a court may remove a trustee 
if that best serves "the interests of the beneficiaries" and is not inconsistent with 
a material purpose of the trust. The term "interests of the beneficiaries" means 
the beneficial interests as provided by the terms of the trust, not as defined 
by the beneficiaries.144 Restatement (Third) of Trusts adopts similar grounds 
for removal of a trustee. 145 
Even under this more relaxed approach, however, a lawsuit is required to 
remove a trustee. This might well dissuade action by beneficiaries reluctant 
to incur the heavy legal fees that could result, especially when under either 
the strict standards of the common law or the more relaxed standards of the 
Uniform Trust Code and the Restatement, it is doubtful that the beneficiaries 
would prevail. A nice remedy to this problem is a trust provision that gives the 
141. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS§ 107 (1959); 2 ScoTT, supra note 58, §§ 107--07.3. 
142. UNIFORM TRUST CODE§ 706(a)(3 ). 
143. Id.§ 706(a){3) cmt. 
144. Id.§ 706(b)(4). 
145. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS§ 37 (1992); see also Ronald Chester & Sarah R. 
Ziomek, Removal of Corporate Trustees Under the Uniform Trust Code and other Current Law: Does a 
Contractual Lens Help Clarify the Rights of Beneficiaries?, 67 Mo. L. REV. 241, 253-56 (2002). 
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beneficiaries power to remove a trustee on their own; beneficiaries may also 
be given a power to appoint a successor trustee. 
If a trustee dies or is removed, and the beneficiaries do not have power 
under the terms of the trust instrument to name a successor, a court will do 
so. According to the general rule, the court is not required to appoint someone 
agreed upon by the beneficiaries, but it must give due regard to their wishes. 
Once again, the Uniform Trust Code goes further, providing that a successor 
trustee may be appointed by "unanimous agreement of the qualified beneficiar-
ies," without the need for court approval, if no person is designated by the 
trust instrument as successor trustee. 146 
3. Multiplication of Beneficiaries 
When a trust is limited to one hundred years or so, the number of 
beneficiaries will usually stay a manageable size, even though administrative 
costs may rise as the class of beneficiaries increases. In a perpetual trust, the 
number of beneficiaries can multiply relentlessly from generation to genera-
tion. If a trust is set up for two children of the settlor and their descendants, 
and each child has two children-which is pretty close to the statistical 
average-and each grandchild has two children, and so on down the genera-
tions, and each generation is measured by twenty-five years, there will be 
sixteen beneficiaries of the trust after one hundred years and 256 after two 
hundred years. Eventually the trust might become unmanageable. But the 
problem can be avoided if separate trusts can be created for the various 
beneficiaries--say by a power of appointment created in trust beneficiaries that 
permits such a division. Alternatively, the trust could give a similar power to 
a trustee. The Uniform Trust Code grants just such a power to trustees, letting 
them divide a trust into two or more separate trusts without court approval, 
so long as notice is given to the beneficiaries. 
Multiplication of beneficiaries is not such a bad thing, provided it does 
not result in burdensome and costly trust administration. It tends to dilute 
the concentration of wealth-unless family wealth increases as fast as the 
family itself. 
III. DEFAULT RULES 
If there is a case against perpetual trusts, it must in our judgment be found 
in the argument that their costs and burdens at some point become too 
great. As we have seen, most of the difficulties of duration can be eliminated 
146. UNIFORM TRUST CODE§ 704(c)(2). 
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by skillful drafting of the trust instrument: creating special powers of appoint-
ment in beneficiaries; discretionary powers in trustees; enabling beneficiaries 
to remove trustees and, when a trustee's office is vacant, to appoint a successor 
trustee; providing that trustees account to adult beneficiaries, so as to avoid 
judicial accountings; and so on. 
Several states permitting perpetual trusts require the trust instrument 
to state that the Rule against Perpetuities does not apply, or require that 
some person must have power to terminate the trust. These have the effect, 
perhaps the purpose, of offering some assurance that the trust instrument is 
prepared by an expert. 147 An important question is what rules should govern 
when the trust instrument is inexpertly drafted. Should trust provisions that 
have come to be undesirable-disadvantageous to beneficiaries, economically 
wasteful-be dealt with by laying down a general rule that terminates a trust 
after a period of time, or rather by a more fine-tuned approach dealing with 
the problems as they arise? 
The Rule against Perpetuities opts for the first approach, but perhaps in 
ways no longer worth their complexities. There are several possible alterna-
tives. First, legislation could provide that, after the income beneficiaries alive 
at the creation of the trust are dead, a court has power to modify or terminate 
the trust if it is to the advantage of the then income beneficiaries. This power 
would be broader than that given by the English Variation of Trusts Act, 
because the court would consider only the benefit to the life tenants, not to 
the remaindermen, as under the English Act. The principle of foreseeability 
underlying the orthodox Rule against Perpetuities would be preserved, because 
the court's authority would not take effect until the income beneficiaries known 
by the settlor are dead. 
Something close to this approach has been adopted in the Canadian 
Province of Manitoba, which in 1983 abolished the Rule against Perpetuities 
altogether and empowered courts to alter or terminate any trust when doing 
so would benefit beneficiaries. 148 The statute differs from the one mentioned 
above in that the court's power of alteration kicks in immediately, not after 
the income beneficiaries alive at the creation of the trust are dead. The 
primary disadvantage of the Manitoba approach, or of any statute requiring 
14 7. See supra notes 4 2-4 3. 
148. MAN. STAT. chs. 38, 43 (2000), R.S.M. ch. P-33 (1987). The Manitoba approach is 
approved by 0.W.M. WATERS, THE LAW OF TRUSTS IN CANADA 1074 (2d ed. ·1984), and by 
Note, Long Live the Dead Hand: A Case for Repeal of the Rule Against Perpetuities in Washington, 75 
WASH. L.R. 1237, 1265 (2000) ("Because the rule prescribes a limit, it is necessarily insensitive to 
economic conditions that might preserve the beneficial consequences of trusts that endure past 
the perpetuities period. Reactive, court-ordered variations from trust terms, however, can find context-
sensitive results where the rule presumes that one size fits all."). 
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court intervention, is that termination or modification requires a lawsuit, 
perhaps of uncertain outcome, with resulting legal fees. 
A second alternative-a rule terminating trusts after a given period of 
time-would avoid the costs and uncertainties of Manitoba's approach, but 
at the price of a new difficulty: In many instances, beneficiaries may be better 
off if their trust continues than if it does not. The observation suggests the 
appeal of a third possible approach, a statute giving the power of modification 
or termination to the income beneficiaries in succession, but only after the 
income beneficiaries known to the settlor die. This would be a general power 
of appointment if, by exercising it, the successive income beneficiaries could 
withdraw the principal for themselves,149 thus giving rise to the tax disadvan-
tages discussed earlier.1so They would be avoided if the statute in question gave 
the beneficiaries not a general power but instead a special power enabling 
them to appoint the trust principal during life or at death to anyone except 
themselves, their creditors, their estates, or the creditors of their estates.1st 
A special power exercisable during life or at death gives the donee the power to 
modify or terminate the trust so as to benefit others. Thus the donee of a special 
power could terminate a trust and order the principal distributed to the 
donee's children. The statute might go further and give each income benefi-
ciary, in addition to a special power, a power to withdraw principal for the 
beneficiary's own benefit, limited by an ascertainable standard relating to 
the beneficiary's health, education, support, or maintenance (such as a power 
to withdraw principal required to maintain the beneficiary in the style of 
living to which the beneficiary is accustomed). Giving the income beneficiaries 
special powers of appointment plus a power to withdraw principal for their 
support would go a substantial way in satisfying any demand for intergenera-
tional equity. 
A fourth way of avoiding a mandatory termination rule or a lawsuit 
over termination or modification of a trust is to give the trustee, by statute, 
a power to terminate the trust. This would be in addition to any discretion-
ary powers given the trustee in the trust instrument to distribute income 
149. Giving the income beneficiaries a general power of appointment resembles the law of 
Scotland, which has no Rule against Perpetuities. Under Scottish law, any life estate (called "liferent") 
created in a person who was not living when the trust was created gives the property to such 
person absolutely. Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1968, ch. 70, pt. IV, 
§ 18 (1). 
150. See supra note 121. The trust instrument could give the income beneficiaries the power 
to go into corpus if necessary for support. A support power is not a general power. I.R.C. § 2041 
(b)(l)(A) (1994). The income beneficiaries might also be given the power to withdraw each year 
$5,000 or 5 percent of the corpus, whichever is greater. This is not a general power. Id. § 2041 (b )(2). 
151. See supra note 122. 
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and principal among the beneficiaries.152 A handful of the states permitting 
perpetual trusts require that some person, who may be the trustee, have the 
power to terminate the trust. 153 The apparent purpose of this is to be able to 
terminate the trust without a lawsuit. 
There are variations on this scheme. A statute could give the beneficiar-
ies power to remove or replace a trustee at will. The power to remove a trustee 
gives "the beneficiary a powerful weapon to put pressure on the trustee to exer-
cise the trustee's powers in the way the beneficiary wants them exercised."154 
Provided the trustee's successor is not related or subordinate to the power 
holder, under current federal tax law, the power to replace a trustee is not a gen-
1 f . 155 era power o appomtment. 
IV. THE FUTURE OF PERPETUAL TRUSTS 
The federal estate tax and the OST tax give substantial advantages to 
perpetual trusts. Although a trust termination rule would provide a way to 
avoid the inefficiencies of perpetual trusts, trust beneficiaries might prefer 
to bear the costs of those inefficiencies in order to save large sums in taxes. 
The beneficiaries of a tax-free trust earning the income from $20 million 
every year will likely view trust costs as peanuts compared to the $8 million 
they would pay in taxes if the trust were terminated and their shares were 
distributed outright. Given the federal tax advantage of perpetual trusts free 
of death taxes, the Rule against Perpetuities has the effect of penalizing bene-
ficiaries of trusts located in states that do not permit perpetual trusts. 
Now, of course, the future of the estate tax and the OST tax is in doubt. In 
2001, Congress enacted legislation that calls for abolition of the estate tax 
and the OST tax (but not the gift tax) in 2010.156 Between 2002 and 2009, the 
exemption from both estate and OST taxes rises in gradual steps from 
$1 million in the case of the estate tax and $1.1 million in the case of the OST 
tax to $3.5 million in 2009.157 The top rate of 50 percent in 2001 will decrease 
in gradual steps to 45 percent in 2007. In 2010, both taxes are scheduled to be 
152. See supra text accompanying notes 130-131. Professors Hirsch and Wang, supra note 
97 at 53, argue that discretionary family trusts should be permitted to exist in perpetuity. A discre-
tionary family trust "can affirmatively benefit a family by providing its members with comprehensive 
insurance against need, while availing society by spreading wealth more equally within that group." 
Id. at 53. 
153. See supra notes 38, 40-41. 
154. 3A A. )AMES CASNER, EsTATE PLANNING§ 12.0 n.3 (5th ed. 1988). 
155. REV. RUL. 95-98 1995-2 C.B. 2. 
156. ECONOMIC GROWTH AND TAX RELIEF RECONCILIATION ACT OF 2001, 115 Stat. 38 
(2001), amending I.R.C. § 501 and adding I.R.C. § 2210 (terminating the estate tax) and§ 2664 
(terminating the GST tax). 
157. See I.R.C. § 2010 (unified credit against estate tax),§ 2631 (GST exemption) (2001). 
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repealed, but a sunset clause in the act causes the entire 2001 act to expire, and 
the estate tax and OST tax, as they existed in 2001, to be revived in 2011. 
Nobody can believe that will happen. Between now and 2011, three courses 
of action are open to Congress. 
First, Congress may let the death taxes expire permanently in 2010. If 
Congress does so, there will be no death tax advantages in perpetual trusts. But 
given the possibility of reimposition of death taxes someday, estate planners 
may continue to recommend perpetual trusts on the theory (or in the hope) 
that if the taxes are reimposed existing perpetual trusts may be grandfathered. 
Second, Congress may continue the death taxes in their present form, 
with perhaps increased exemptions and reduced rates. The exemption will be 
$3.5 million in 2009, but a compromise solution might raise that figure to $5 
million or more. Family farms and family businesses might be exempted. 
With an increased dollar exemption, the tax advantages of perpetual dynasty 
trusts will increase enormously. With $3.5 million or more as the original 
trust principal, the value of the trust, especially considering leveraging with 
life insurance or other schemes, might grow into hundreds of millions of dollars 
over time. In that event, more states can be expected to provide for perpetual 
trusts, in order to put their residents in the same position as taxpayers in 
states permitting perpetual trusts, and allow their banks to compete for trust 
business. A compromise of this sort-taxing the Really Rich but not the 
Merely Rich-seems the most likely outcome in the struggle over abolishing 
death taxes. 
Third, Congress may continue death taxes but amend the generation-
skipping transfer tax so that the exemption for gifts in trust applies only to 
trusts ending upon the death of persons in being at the creation of the trust 
(plus any actual minority thereafter), or ending after some other given period 
of time. By limiting the tax exemption, Congress would effectively be enacting 
a rule terminating trusts after a given period, but there is at present no 
sentiment in Congress to do this. The move would increase death taxes, and 
the prospect for increasing death taxes now is quite remote. Moreover, the 
tax advantages of perpetual trusts will not be realized as cash in hand for at 
least half a century, and Congress seems not to have noticed them. It is not 
likely that Congress will pay any attention to this loophole in the near future. 
The short of it is that Congress has come to be in charge of trust dura-
tion. The future of perpetual trusts is in its hands, to be dealt with through the 
tax system. The role of the states is to develop affordable means for modifying 
and terminating trusts when that is in the best interests of the beneficiaries. 
We have reached a great turning point in the law of trusts. 
